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Abstract
This Article highlights some of the critical distinctions between small
data surveillance and big data cybersurveillance as methods of intelligence
gathering. Specifically, in the intelligence context, it appears that "collectit-all" tools in a big data world can now potentially facilitate the
construction, by the intelligence community, of other individuals' digital
avatars. The digital avatar can be understood as a virtual representation of
our digital selves and may serve as a potential proxy for an actual person.
This construction may be enabled through processes such as the data fusion
of biometric and biographic data, or the digital data fusion of the 24/7
surveillance of the body and the 360° surveillance of the biography.
Further, data science logic and reasoning, and big data policy rationales,
appear to be driving the expansion of these emerging methods.
Consequently, I suggest that an inquiry into the scientific validity of the data
science that informs big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance is
appropriate.
As a topic of academic inquiry, thus, I argue in favor of a science-driven
approach to the interrogation of rapidly evolving bulk metadata and mass
data surveillance methods that increasingly rely upon data science and big
data's algorithmic, analytic, and integrative tools. In Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court
required scientific validity determinations prior to the introduction of
scientific expert testimony or evidence at trial. I conclude that to the extent
that covert intelligence gathering relies upon data science, a Daubert-type
inquiry is helpful in conceptualizing the proper analytical structure
necessary for the assessment and oversight of these emerging mass
surveillance methods.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The disclosures of former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
Edward Snowden' underscore why, as a matter of statutory and

l. See, e.g ., GLENN GREENWALD, No PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE
U .S . SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014) (discussing in detail the history of the Snowden disclosures) .
Scholars and experts have focused careful attention on the legal implications of the mass
surveillance activities of the NSA and the intelligence community in work both preceding and
following the disclosures of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. See, e.g., Laura K . Donohue,
Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV . J.L. &
PuB. POL'Y 117 (2015) ; Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Realism and the National Security Agency's
Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV . NAT'L SEC. J. 112 (2015); Laura K . Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PuB . POL'Y 757 (2014) ;
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constitutional mqmry, it is important to focus attention on the critical
distinctions between small data2 surveillance3 and big data4

Orin S . Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV . 1513 (2014);
Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Content Collection
After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS LJ . I (2014); Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden,
7 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 333 (2014); Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10
J.L. & POL'Y INFO. SOC'Y 551 (2014) ; Omer Tene, A New Harm Matrix for Cybersecurity
Surveillance, 12 COLO. TECH. LJ. 391 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance,
Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. LJ. 1721 (2014); Nathan A.
Sales, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA Controversy, 10 US:
J.L. & POL' Y INFO. Soc'Y 523 (2014); John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency's
Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV . J.L. & PuB . POL'Y 901 (2014); Margot E . Kaminski &
Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond
Chilling Speech, 49 U . RICH . L. REV . 465 (2015); Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What? The

Importance of Defining A Search 's Object-or, How the ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata
Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA . L. REV. 725 (2014); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 61 (2014);
Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance , Criminal
Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014); Paul Ohm, Electronic
Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV . 269 (2012).
Several important works have been published in recent years, shedding light on mass surveillance
technologies, and the policy and programmatic framework of cybersurveillance and covert
intelligence gathering. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY,
SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17-18 (2014); SHANE
HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); DANA PRIEST &
WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECREf AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE
(2011); SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS (2010); ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE
(2006); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN
ANXIOUS AGE (2004) .
2. '" Small data,' like 'big data,' has no set definition." Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U . PA. L. REV. 327, 329 n.6 (2015). "Small data" has
been described in the following way: "Generally, small data is thought of as solving discrete
questions with limited and structured data, and the data are generally controlled by one institution."
Id. (citing JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA: PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING
COMPLEX INFORMATION 1-2 (2013)) . In many important recent works, scholars and experts have
observed the transformational nature of emerging technologies of the Information Society-such as
the Internet, digital culture, technological innovations in surveillance capacities-and the legal and
privacy implications of such transformative technological developments. See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM &
TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION (2013); SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE
(2011); CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin
Wittes eds ., 2011) ; SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW
WIREfAPPING TECHNOLOGIES (2010); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET-AND
How TO STOP IT (2008); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW (2007); LA WREN CE
LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 (2006); JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
(2006) MARK POSTER, INFORMATION PLEASE: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DIGITAL
MACHINES (2006);A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN . L. REV . 1461 (2000).
3. The term "small data surveillance" is neither widely used nor, to the best of my knowledge,
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cybersurveillance.5 The Snowden disclosures reveal that, in addition to the
traditional communications that the intelligence community once sought in a
small data world, organizations such as the NSA are increasingly exploiting
newly available mass data surveillance, or dataveillance, 6 and
cybersurveillance tools7 in a big data world.8 Specifically, from the

officially defined. In this Article, the term is used as a way to mark a contrast between traditional
intelligence gathering methods (i .e ., "small data surveillance") and newly emerging intelligence
methods that are digital data-driven, dependent upon supercomputing capacities, and capitalize on
big data phenomena and tools (i.e., "big data cybersurveillance"). As technology has transformed
the Information Society, surveillance methods have transformed as well. David Lyon, Surveillance,
Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & Soc. 2 (2014) ("[A]s
political-economic and socio-technological circumstances change, so surveillance also undergoes
alteration, sometimes transformation."). Historically, it appears that in a small data world,
intelligence gathering methods have relied upon human intelligence, including human sensory
perception analysis, and other communication gathering and analytic methods that have depended
upon human judgment and human decisionmaking; traditional evidence based upon analog data and
paper-based files; traditional intelligence collection methods, such as traditional signals intelligence
and other traditional communications interception; and other data analytic tools that have centered
upon traditional research approaches, such as hypothesis-driven methods. See, e.g ., ROBERT M.
CLARK, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (2014); ROBERT WALLACE & H. KEITH MELTON, WITH HENRY
R. SCHLESINGER, AND FOREWARD BY GEORGE TENEf, SPYCRAFf: THE SECREf HISTORY OF THE
CIA ' S SPYTECHS FROM COMMUNISM TO AL-QAEDA (2008) .
4. "Big data" is difficult to define, as it is a newly evolving field and the technologies that it
encompasses are evolving rapidly as well. See discussion infra Part II.A.l ("What is Big Data?").
See generally infra Parts II-III. Multiple authors have addressed the characteristics of "big data"
and the challenges posed by big data technologies . See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER &
KENNEfH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND
THINK (2013); BERMAN, supra note 2; PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS
FOR ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane, Victoria Stodden, Stefan Bender & Helen Nissenbaum eds ., 2014);
ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR
CONSEQUENCES (2014) .
5 . See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 2, at 209 (describing cybersurveillance or "digital surveillance"
as "the process by which some form of human activity is analyzed by a computer according to some
specified rule .... [T]he critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting
data for some follow-up review by some human.").
6 . Roger Clarke is attributed with introducing the term "dataveillance." See Roger A . Clarke,
Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498 (1988) . Clarke describes
dataveillance as the systematic monitoring or investigation of people 's actions, activities, or
communications through the application of information technology . Id.; see also LYON, supra note
2, at 16 ("Being much cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance [dataveillance] enables
the watching of more people or populations, because economic constraints to surveillance are
reduced. Dataveillance also automates surveillance. Classically, government bureaucracies have
been most interested in gathering such data . . . .") ; MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS (2007) (examining constitutional
implications of "knowledge discovery in databases" (KDD applications) through dataveillance).
7. The Snowden disclosures have included multiple high-profile revelations on newly emerging
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disclosures and other publicly available information, it appears that in the
intelligence context, "collect-it-all" 9 tools in a big data world 10 can now

data surveillance, or dataveillance tools, and cybersurveillance methods, and information specific to
their implementation. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of
Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order; Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British
Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH.
POST (June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-datafrom-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11 e2-8845-d9
70ccb04497_story .html; T .C. Sottek & Josh Kopstein, Everything You Need to Know About PRISM,
VERGE,
(July
13,
2013),
http://www .theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsa-spying-prismsurveillance-cheat-sheet; Scott Shane, No Morsel Too Minuscule For All-Consuming N.SA., From
Spying on Leader of UN. to Tracking Drug Deals, an Ethos of 'Why Not'?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2013) Al, AlO, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minusculefor-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0; Ellen Nakashima & Barton Gellman, Court Gave NSA Broad
Leeway in Surveillance, Documents Show, WASH. POST (June 30, 2014), http://www.washingtonpos
t.com/world/national-security/court-gave-nsa-broad-leeway-in-surveillance-documents-show/2014/0
6/30/32b872ec-fae4-1 le3-8176-f2c94 lcf35fl_story .html.
8. Several scholars have begun to use the term "big data surveillance" to describe how
surveillance methods are evolving in light of the emerging pervasiveness of big data technologies .
See, e.g ., Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data, supra note 3, at 4 ("The Big Data/surveillance
link was recognized by US President Obama on 17 January 2014, when he called for a
'comprehensive review of Big Data and privacy' following the Snowden leaks." (citation omitted)) ;
Mark Andrejevic, Surveillance in the Big Data Era, in EMERGING PERVASIVE INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (PICT): ETHICAL CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND
SAFEGUARDS 56 (Kenneth D. Pimple ed., 2014) ("[l]n the era of 'big data' surveillance, the
imperative is to monitor the population as a whole: otherwise it is harder to consistently and reliably
discern useful patterns.") . Other scholars and experts have documented how the NSA, CIA, and
other intelligence organizations capitalize on technological innovation in the evolution and
expansion of intelligence gathering tools and methods. See, e.g ., JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW
FACTORY : THE ULTRA-SECREf NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008);
JAMES BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE: INSIDE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY AMERICA'S
MOST SECREf INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (1982) ; William C. Banks, Programmatic
Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV . 1633 (2010); Peter P . Swire,
Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REV . 951 (2006).
9 . GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 97 (citing NSA slide from Snowden disclosures titled, "New
Collection Posture," quoting NSA data collection procedure as "Collect it All"), available at
http://glenngreenwald.net/pdf/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Compressed.pdf; see also David Cole,
'No Place to Hide' by Glenn Greenwald, on the NSA's Sweeping Efforts to 'Know it All', WASH.
POST (May 12, 2014) ("In one remarkable [NSA] slide presented at a 2011 meeting of five nations'
intelligence agencies and revealed here for the first time, the NSA described its "collection posture"
as "Collect it All," "Process it All," "Exploit it All," "Partner it All," "Sniff it All" and, ultimately,
"Know it All.").
10. The legal, science, social, and other consequences of what has been termed the "big data
revolution" have been an topic of intense academic inquiry. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Jonathan
H. King; Three Paradoxes of Big Data; 66 STAN. L. REV . ONLINE 41 (2013); Solon Barocas &
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV . (forthcoming 2016); Kate
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potentially facilitate the construction of digital avatars, 11 or the virtual
representation 12 of our digital selves.13 Significant legal and constitutional

Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive
Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of
Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN . L. REV. ONLINE 63 (2012) . Some scholars have
focused particularly on the algorithmic-driven decisionmaking consequences of emerging big data
technologies. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV . 1 (2014); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK
Box SOCIETY (2015). Other experts have focused on the data mining and predictive analytic
capacities of big data tools. See, e.g ., STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND
BIG DATA: MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS, AND METHODS (2014); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE
ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE (2013); NATE SILVER,
THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY So MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL-BUT SOME DON'T (2012); Fred
H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
435 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV . 317 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U . CHI. L.
REV. 343 (2008). At the dawn of the big data revolution, scholars are now actively interrogating the
implications of government-led big data uses by the government and law enforcement. See, e.g.,
Joshua A.T . Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV . 981 (2014); David Gray
& Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV . 62 (2013); Neil M.
Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
11. See infra Part IV A. (discussing why the term "digital avatar" may best describe this
phenomenon). The term "digital avatar" is used often in the video gaming context, and most
commonly refers to a digitally constructed representation of the computing user or, in some instance,
the representation of the user's alter ego or character. See, e.g., Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717
F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2012). In Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., for example, a class action suit of college
athletes alleged that their digital avatars and likeness had been unlawfully appropriated for profit by
the video game developer, Electronic Arts, Inc . See id.
12. The introduction of virtual reality and virtual worlds has raised increasingly complicated
legal questions. For example, in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n, 131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011),
the Supreme Court considered the First Amendment implications of expressive speech of video
games . It explained,
Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games
communicate ideas-and even social messages-through many familiar literary devices
(such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the
medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer
First Amendment protection.
Id. at 2733; see also Joshua A.T . Fairfield, Mixed Reality: How the Laws of Virtual Worlds Govern
Everyday Life, 27 BERKELEY TECH . LJ. 55, 71 (2012); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Parentalism,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV . 1215 (2009); Joshua A .T. Fairfield, Escape Into the Panopticon: Virtual
Worlds and the Surveillance Society, 118 YALE LJ. POCKET PART 131 (2009); Marc Jonathan Blitz,
The Freedom of 3D Thought: The First Amendment in Virtual Reality, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1141
(2008). Increasingly, scholars are interrogating the legal implications of self-representations and
digital avatar representations in virtual worlds. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Law and the
Emotive Avatar, 11 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 899 (2009).
13. See infra Part IV A; see also David Cole, ls Privacy Obsolete? Thanks to the Revolution in
Digital Technology, Privacy is About to Go the Way of the Eight-Track Player, THE NATION (Apr. 6,
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consequences attach to these rapidly evolving technologies of mass
surveillance and bulk data collection, and their application .14
To help illustrate this historically significant transition from small data
surveillance methods to big data cybersurveillance methods, 15 it is
instructive to focus on one sentence extracted from one alleged document
released from the Snowden archives . In a New York Times article by James
Risen and Laura Poitras published on June 1, 2014, titled NSA Collecting
2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/ 198505/pri vacy-20-surveillance-digital-age# ("Digital technology has exponentially expanded the government's ability to construct intimate portraits of any
particular individual by collecting all sorts of disparate data and combining and analyzing them for
revealing patterns."); Frank Gillett, How Will You Manage Your Digital Self?,
INFORMATIONWEEK.COM, (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.informationweek.com/software/social/howwill-you-manage-your-digital-self/d/d-id/ll 12130 ("The digital self is not just your work and
personal computer files . It includes all of the complex and varied digital information that you and
the organizations you deal with generate .").
14. Several scholars have noted how transformative technological shifts have also transformed
methods of governance and surveillance as a tool of governance . See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, OldSchool/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV . L. REV . 2296, 2297 (2014) ("The digital era is
different. Governments can target for control or surveillance many different aspects of the digital
infrastructure that people use to communicate: telecommunications and broadband companies, web
hosting services, domain name registrars, search engines, social media platforms, payment systems,
and advertisers.") ; Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV . 1 (2008) [hereinafter Balkin, National Surveillance State] ; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National
Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV . 489 (2006); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion
and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J . ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321 (2012); David Lyon, Biometrics,
Identification and Surveillance, 22 BIOETIIlCS 499 (2008); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57
DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008) .
15. Following the Snowden disclosures, at least one expert has asserted that the NSA is
attempting to merge big data tools with small data tools . See, e.g., Kate Crawford, The Anxieties of
Big Data, THE NEW INQUIRY (May 30, 2014), available at http://thenewinquiry .com/essays/theanxieties-of-big-data/ (" [A Squeaky Dolphin PowerPoint slide from the Snowden disclosures]
outlines an expansionist program to bring big data together with the more traditional approaches of
the social and humanistic sciences: the worlds of small data ... . [A]nd it is all about supplementing
[big] data analysis with broader sociocultural tools from anthropology, sociology, political science,
biology, history, psychology, and economics."). Scholars and experts have also juxtaposed small
data policing and surveillance practices with big data policing and surveillance practices as a way to
deepen the legal and constitutional discourse . See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 2, at 329 (discussing in
the context of predictive policing practices: "[W]hat happens if this small data suspicion [suspicion
that is 'individualized to a particular person at a particular place'] is replaced by 'big data'
suspicion?"); Toomey & Kaufman, supra note I, at 847 (describing a "notice paradox" whereby in a
small data surveillance world "notice was all but automatic in most cases ... [because] searches
were confined to a physical world"; however, with big data surveillance methods and "the rise of
electronic surveillance conducted remotely and surreptitiously[,]" the authors observe that "the
government has achieved an unprecedented measure of control over when, and to whom, notice [of
the surveillance] is given.") .
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Millions of Faces From Web Images, 16 the authors discuss NSA documents
from the Snowden disclosures that focus on biometric data collection 17 (e.g.,
scanned fingerprints, irises, digital photos and facial recognition technology,
and DNA). 18 The authors note that an alleged 2010 NSA document
explains: "'It's not just the traditional communications we're after: It's
taking a full-arsenal approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves
behind in their regular activities on the net to compile biographic and
biometric information' that can help 'implement precision targeting."' 19

16. James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.SA. Collecting Millions of Faces from Web Images, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2014, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes .com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collectingmillions-of-faces-from-web-i mages .html.
17. Whether biometric data is defined in the disclosures is not mentioned; however, the authors
specifically reference NSA's interest in the specific types of biometric data: "facial recognition
technology" and "facial images [from digital photos, videoconferences, etc .], fingerprints and other
identifiers ." Id. ("While once focused on written and oral communications, the N .SA. now
considers facial images, fingerprints and other identifiers just as important to its mission of tracking
suspected terrorists and other intelligence targets, the documents show.").
18. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. LJ. 1475 (2013).
Biometrics is "[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of individuals using
physiological or behavioral characteristics." JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND
VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007). Numerous scholars and experts have explored the science and
application of biometrics and the consequences of this emerging technology. See, e.g ., Laura K.
Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012); JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS
TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U .S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND (2012);
A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & JONATHAN WEINBERG, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW &
Soc. POLICY, HARD TO BELIEVE: THE HIGH COST OF A BIOMETRIC IDENTITY CARD (2012),
available at http://www.law .berkeley .edu/files/Believe_Report_Final.pdf; KELLY A . GATES, OUR
BIOMETRIC FuTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE
(2011); ANIL K. JAIN, ARUN A. Ross, KARTHIK NANDAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION TO BIOMETRICS
(2011); SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, RACE, AND THE
TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY (2011); BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
(Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millett eds., 2010) [hereinafter BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION] ; DAVID
LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 118-36 (2007); VACCA, supra; ROBERT
O'HARROW, JR., No PLACE TO HIDE 157-89 (2005); Robin Feldman, Considerations on the
Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 653 (2003) ;
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-174, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS
FOR BORDER SECURITY (2002) [hereinafter GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157313.pdf; SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH
OF PRIVACY INTHE21ST CENTURY 37-67 (2000).
19. Risen & Poitras, supra note 16. The use of the term "targeting" in this alleged 2010 NSA
document from the Snowden disclosures does not appear to be defined . However, the term
"targeting" in the defense and intelligence context has been defined as "[t]he process of selecting
and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering commander's
objectives, operational requirements, capabilities, and limitations." See U .S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE,
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As this Article will attempt to explain, in the intelligence context, it
appears that big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance tools may
now risk the conflation of the digitally constructed virtual representation of a
"target" with an actual person. Viewed through the lens of this risk, it
appears that the reference to the "target" in the alleged 2010 NSA document
above may be more appropriately and descriptively characterized as a digital
avatar in that it appears that the "target" may be a product of data fusion,2° or
an amalgamation of data, 21 (e.g., "digitally exploit[ing] the clues a target
leaves behind in their regular activities on the [Inter]net to compile
biographic and biometric information"), 22 and may not represent an actual
person (e.g., "signature strike" where the identity of the target of a drone
strike may be unknown) .23
OFACE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE Cl & HUMINT CENTER, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY , GLOSSARY (UNCLASSIFIED), TERMS & DEANITIONS OF INTEREST FOR DOD
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS, at GL-167 (2011), available at http://fas .org/irp/eprint/ciglossary .pdf; see also id. (defining the counterintelligence community's use of the word "target" as
"1) An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action; 2) in intelligence usage,
a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed; 3)
an area designated and numbered for future firing; and 4) in gunfire support usage, an impact burst
that hits the target.") .
20. In the intelligence context, "fusion" or "data fusion" has been described as "the collection of
information from myriad sources to be organized and analyzed for a fuller picture of terrorist or
other threats ." PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 1, at 92. In the consumer context, "data fusion" has
been defined in the following way: "Data fusion occurs when data from different sources are brought
into contact and new facts emerge[.]" PRESIDENT' S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY ("PCAST"), BIG DATA AND PRIVACY : A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (May 2014)
[hereinafter PCAST REPORT], available at https://www .whitehouse .gov/sites/default/files/microsite
s/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may _2014.pdf; see infra Parts III-IV .
Several
scholars and experts have explored the legal and surveillance implications of data fusion centers that
have been created by the government, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
See , e.g., PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 1, at 92-93 ; Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 1;
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence
Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS LJ. 1441 (2011) .
21. See infra Parts III-IV.
22. Risen & Poitras, supra note 16.
23. "Signature strikes" are "a controversial [targeted killing] practice" where the "defining
characteristics associated with terrorist activity [of the targets are identified], but whose identities
aren't necessarily known." DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THEWAR ON TERROR AND THE
SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 41 (2012) . After the Snowden disclosures, several media reports
have indicated that the revelations establish "collaboration between the CIA and NSA" in the
targeted killing program . Greg Miller, Julie Tate & Barton Gellman, Documents Reveal NSA's
Massive Involvement in Targeted Killing Program, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2013), available at http://
www .washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in
-targeted-killing-program/2013/1 O/l 6/29775278-3674-1 le3-8a0e-4e2cf8083 lfc_print.html ("[T]he
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Nonetheless, it appears that the legal or other consequences that may
flow from the big data cybersurveillance or mass dataveillance methods are
suffered by the person associated with the suspicious digital data and,
potentially, conflated with the guilty digital avatar or the digital avatar's
technological surrogate (e.g., a smartphone).24 In other words, in a big data
world, the intelligence community may view the digital avatar or
technological surrogate as a proxy for the actual person targeted.25
From the disclosures, it appears that the "full-arsenal approach" to
newly emerging mass surveillance methods employs data science26 to
[Snowden] documents provide the most detailed account of the intricate collaboration between the
CIA and the NSA in the drone campaign."); Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald, The NSA's Secret
Role in the U.S. Assassination Program, INTERCEPT (Feb. 9, 2014), available at
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/ ("According to a former drone
operator for the military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the
NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone
tracking technologies."). Prior to the Snowden disclosures, media reports indicated that drone
strikes could be authorized based upon "patterns of suspicious behavior." Greg Miller, Broader
Drone Tactics Sought, WASH . POST, Apr. 19, 2012, at Al ("The CIA is seeking authority to expand
its covert drone campaign in Yemen by launching strikes against terrorism suspects even when it
does not know the identities of those who could be killed, U .S . officials said. Securing permission to
use these 'signature strikes' would allow the agency to hit targets based solely on intelligence
indicating patterns of suspicious behavior[.]"). Due to the covert nature of the targeted killing
program, however, limited information is available on precisely what intelligence may inform drone
strikes and signature strikes. See generally DAVIDE. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: 0BAMA'S
SECREf WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 241-70 (2012) (describing use of drones
and targeted killing strategy in the "war on terror"); JEREMY SCAHILL, DIRTY WARS (2013); Kevin
Jon Heller, 'One Hell of a Killing Machine' : Signature Strikes and International Law, 11 J. INT' L
CRIM. JUST. 89, 89 (2013); Kenneth Anderson, The Secret "Kill List" and the President, 3 J.L.:
PERIODICAL LABORATORY OF LEG. SCHOLARSHIP 93 (2013).
24. For example, according to one media report, a drone operator explained that drone strikes
target not a suspicious person necessarily, but, rather may target a digital avatar proxy-suspicious
phones . Scahill & Greenwald, supra note 23 ("We ' re not going after people-we' re going after
their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy ."); see also
Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA . L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) .
25. Scahill & Greenwald, supra note 23 ("According to a former drone operator for the
military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency
often identifies targets based on controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking
technologies .") .
26. Like the terms "small data" and "big data" that are not yet clearly defined as of yet, the terms
"data science," "data-driven science" and "big data science" have no set, agreed-upon definition .
Generally, however, "[i]n contrast to new forms of empiricism, data-driven science seeks to hold to
the tenets of the scientific method, but is more open to using a hybrid combination of abductive,
inductive and deductive approaches to advance the understanding of a phenomenon ." Rob Kitchin,
Big Data, New Epistemologies and Paradigm Shifts, BIG DATA & Soc'y J ., Apr.-June 2014, at 1.
Data science, thus, has been used to describe a new field of study and academic research that is
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determine the data-driven suspicion and guilt of digital avatars.27 Properly
assessing the scientific validity of this approach, therefore, becomes central
to the legal inquiry. Consequently, in this Article, I contend that the
perceived capacities or presumed intelligence value of big data
dependent upon big data technological developments and tools . According to a National Science
Foundation Solicitation, the term "big data science & engineering" appears to include the study of
the:
core scientific and technological means of managing, analyzing, visualizing, and
extracting useful information from large, diverse, distributed and heterogeneous data sets
so as to: accelerate the progress of scientific discovery and innovation; lead to new fields
of inquiry that would not otherwise be possible; encourage the development of new data
analytic tools and algorithms; facilitate scalable, accessible, and sustainable data
infrastructure[.]
NAT'L SCI. FOUND., SOLICITATION 12-499, CORE TECHNIQUIES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR
ADVANCING BIG DATA SCIENCE & ENGINEERING (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/
2012/nsfl 2499/nsfl 2499 .htm.
27. Multiple scholars are carefully examining the legal implications of targeted killing policies
and drone strikes as a linchpin of U.S. counterterrorism policy. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The
Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted Killings, Legal Constraints, and Judicial Safeguards, 38
HARV. J.L. & PuB . POL'Y 21 (2015); Oren Gross, The New Way of War: ls There A Duty to Use
Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2015); Gregory S . McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102
GEO. LJ. 681 (2014); Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off the Record: The National Security
Council, Drone Killings, and Historical Accountability, 31 YALE J . ON REG. 363 (2014); David W .
Opderbeck, Drone Courts, 44 RUTGERS LJ. 413 (2014); Matthew Craig, Targeted Killing,
Procedure, and False Legitimation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2349 (2014); Jenny-Brooke Condon,
Illegal Secrets, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 1099 (2014); Jennifer Daskal, The Geography of the
Battleflield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone, 171 U. PA.
L. REV. 1165 (2013); Amos Guiora, LEGITIMATE TARGET: A CRITERIA-BASED APPROACH TO
TARGETED KILLING (2013), Deborah Pearlstein, Enhancing Due Process in Targeted Killing,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY ISSUE BRIEF (Oct. 2013); Richard Murphy & Afsheen John
Radsan, Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard Before the President Kills You, 48 WAKE FOREST
L. REV . 829 (2013); Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH . L. REV . 1
(2013); Leila Nadya Sadat, America's Drone Wars, 45 CASE W. RES. J . INT'L L. 215 (2012); Carla
Crandall, Ready ... Fire ... Aim! A Case for Applying American Due Process Principles Before
Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 55 (2012); Pardiss Kebriaei, The Distance Between

Principle and Practice in the Obama Administration's Targeted Killing Program: A Response to Jeh
Johnson, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 151 (2012) ; Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted KillingA Historical and Post-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT'L L. 259 (2012); Robert Chesney,
Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of
Lethal Force, in Y .B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. (M.N. Schmitt et al. eds., 2011); Lesley Wexler,
Litigating the Long War on Terror: The Role of al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 9 LoY . U . CHI . INT'L L. REV .
159 (2011); Phllip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV . NAT'L SEC. J .
283 (2011); Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM (Ben Wittes ed., 2009); Richard
Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV . 405 (2009); Daphne Barak-Erez & Matthew C. Waxman, Secret Evidence and the Due Process
of Terrorist Detentions, 48 COLUM.J. TRANS. L. 3 (2009) .
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cybersurveillance and bulk metadata collection programs can be more fully
interrogated through a rigorous scientific critique. I argue that this scientific
validity determination is particularly justified if, as General Michael
Hayden, former Director of the NSA and CIA, explains: "We kill people
based on metadata." 28
This Article, therefore, uses this single sentence from a single document
released by the Snowden disclosures as a vehicle to illustrate that further
dialogue is needed on whether this "full-arsenal approach" to surveillance
increasingly relies upon data science, data fusion processes, and the "fullarsenal" of algorithmic, analytic, and integrative big data tools for "precision
targeting." As part of the Symposium, The Future of National Security Law,
the Article aims to accomplish two goals. First, it extends the important
conversation on the future of mass surveillance programs "in the PostSnowden age" 29 that was raised at the Symposium and builds upon my
comments at this event. And, second, this Article, specifically, helps to
explain why a scientific-driven inquiry might be useful to inform the
impending challenges of big data-driven national security policymaking and
the role of big data cybersurveillance in national security law.
At the outset, it is important to explain that this research relies
exclusively upon publicly available sources. At this time, this academic
endeavor is greatly enhanced as the public has been granted access to more
classified documents relating to covert intelligence activities than ever
before by virtue of the Snowden disclosures, media and investigative
reports, and national security revelations through other intelligence sources.
Yet, like the work of other scholars engaged in similar research, this work is
necessarily constrained in its conclusions and restricted to the information
available, which is, of course, incomplete.
Although informed heavily by credible sources and reports on
intelligence activities, public statements by intelligence officials, and actual
government documents, such as the Snowden disclosures, this symposium
piece might be considered best as a thought experiment. As a result of this

28. David Cole, 'We Kill People Based on Metadata', N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/may/ 10/we-kill-people-based-metadata/; Lee Ferran,
Ex-NSA Chief' 'We Kill People Based on Metadata ,' ABC NEWS (May 12, 2014, 12:59 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-people-based-on-metadata/.
29. Jane Harman, Security Policies for a Post-Snowden Age, WASH. POST OPINIONS (Nov. 7,
2013 ), http://www .washingtonpost.com/opinions/securi ty-policies-for-a-post-snowden-age/2013/ 11/
07/be307c90-464c-11 e3-a 196-3544a03c235 l_story .html.
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thought experiment, I conclude that a scientific cntique, such as the one
required by the Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,30 may aid in assessing the efficacy of big data-driven
national security policymaking and the scientific validity of covert big data
cybersurveillance methods.
In Daubert, a landmark case, the Court determined that a trial judge
must engage in a preliminary assessment of whether scientific testimony is
reliable.31 For example, a trial court must assess whether the scientific
testimony promulgated by a scientific expert is based on a methodology that
is scientifically valid.32 A trial court must further determine whether the
scientific reasoning is generally accepted, and whether this scientific method
or scientific reasoning can be properly and consistently applied to the facts
at issue.33
This Article simply explains why Daubert is relevant to newly emerging
big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance methods. I reserve for
30. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) . Under the Daubert standard, the evidence must be not only relevant,
but also reliable . Id. at 589. Several factors often considered in determining whether the
methodology is valid are: (1) whether the theory or technique in question can be and has been tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) its known or potential error
rate; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and (5) whether it has
attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community . Id. at 593- 95. Daubert was
the first in line of a trilogy of case exploring the relationship between Federal Rules of Evidence
(FRE) 702 and scientific expert testimony admissibility . The trilogy consists of Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 579 (1993), General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co . v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) .
31. Daubert, 509 U.S . at 598. Multiple scholars have carefully explored the significance of the
Daubert decision. See, e .g., David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 27 (2013) ; David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the
Birth of Modernity: Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C . DAVIS L. REV . 101
(2013); Eric Lasker, Manning the Daubert Gate: A Defense Primer in Response to Milward v.
Acuity Specialty Products, 79 DEF. COUNS . J. 128, 128 (2012); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert
Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2008); Erin
Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of
Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721 (2007); David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The
Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351 , 355-56 (2004) ; Michael J. Saks, The
Aftermath of Daubert: An Evolving Jurisprudence of Expert Evidence, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 229, 233347 (2000).
32. Id. ; see, e.g ., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S . 137, 147 (1999) (recognizing and
affirming Daubert's evidentiary rationale by stating that "[i]n Daubert, this Court held that Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to 'ensure that any and all
scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reliable ."' (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert,
509 U.S . at 589)).
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
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future scholarship the inquiry of whether the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and other courts should be bound by Daubert-or a
similar method of scientific inquiry-in evaluating the validity of big data
cybersurveillance, mass surveillance, or bulk data collection programs.34
Rather, this Article claims that the Supreme Court initiated with Daubert a
tradition of closely interrogating the scientific reasoning and scientific
method underlying a proposed piece of evidence as a way to assess whether
that evidence should have a legal consequence. Such a consequence might
include, for example, an admissibility determination that could result in the
introduction of evidence to a jury in a trial. Just as forensic evidence has
come to dominate much of the evidence that is debated in the criminal law
context, the data science evidence that informs intelligence and law
enforcement activities should be increasingly and openly debated. This is
especially the case when the scientific method may be needed to assess the
efficacy of big data tools used in investigation and prosecution.35
In this Article, I address presumptively sanctioned intelligence
gathering36 by governmental entities conducted by both the domestic
intelligence and foreign intelligence components.37 I do not address
surveillance of a purely private or corporate enterprise matter.38 I further
34. Specifically, in future research, I will explore how a Daubert-type inquiry could be
integrated as method for weighing the evidentiary value of conclusions derived from mass
cybersurvellance and big data cybersurveillance programs. In addition, I will examine ways in
which Daubert-type analyses could be a part of what courts may consider in assessing Fourth
Amendment challenges and other privacy-related constitutional challenges to mass surveillance
methods. Whether efficacy and scientific validity can be required as a matter of statutory
compliance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or any other statutory framework
operating to guide the oversight of foreign and domestic intelligence gathering, is an interesting
academic inquiry that I also reserve for future scholarship.
35. See, e.g., Fairfield & Luna, supra note 10 (discussing how big data tools, including secret
intelligence, are increasingly used to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of criminal
defendants).
36. The government has defended the legality of its intelligence activities. See, e.g., Kenneth T.
Walsh, Obama Defends NSA Surveillance, U.S. NEWS (June 18, 2003, 10:04 AM), http://www.usne
ws.com/news/blogs/ken-walshs-washington/2013/06/18/obama-defends-nsa-surveillance. The constitutionality of the NSA's bulk telephony metadata collection program is the subject of ongoing
litigation and is not yet resolved. See infra Part 11.D.
37. I clarify that this Article focuses on governmental information and intelligence gathering and
the collection and analysis of cybersurveillance intelligence by the government or official
governmental delegates.
38. It has been well acknowledged, of course, the extent to which purely private uses of
technologies and corporate enterprise technologies are quickly expanding governmental
cybersurveillance capacities . See, e.g., Christian Fuchs, Societal and Ideological Impacts of Deep
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clarify that this Article is not a blanket rejection of big data tools. There are
legitimate uses for big data tools in many contexts, and scholars are actively
exploring the consequences and ethics of these tools in private and corporate
settings.39 Without understanding the architecture of mass surveillance and
its proponents' aspirations, however, such a legal analysis will not be
adequate to its purpose.
An informed dialogue requires taking stock of what we understand to be
the current surveillance methods in a big data world and offering a Dauberttype lens of scientific validity to these methods. In fact, it is significant to
note that a criminal defendant has already attempted to use Daubert as a
method to critique the scientific validity of a mass cybersurveillance system
that had been deployed to collect evidence against the defendant. 40 Though
constrained in their public discourse due to the covert nature of their actions,
I argue that the intelligence community can and should engage in a

Packet Inspection Internet Surveillance, 16 INFO., COMM. & Soc'y 1328, 1329 (2013)
("[S]urveillance does not only have a state dimension (police and secret services monitoring citizens
in order to catch criminals, terrorists, and repressing political opponents), but also has a corporate
dimension: surveillance technology is a very lucrative business. State surveillance is fuelled by
private businesses that produce and sell monitoring technologies that allow the surveillance of
mobile phone communication, fixed line phones, email, and Internet communication and thereby
achieve profit.") . Many have also noted that governmental intelligence gathering responsibilities are
increasingly delegated to purely private, corporate enterprises in ways that are both official and
unofficial. See, e.g., David Talbot, Bruce Schneier: NSA Spying ls Making Us Less Safe, MIT TECH.
REV. (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www .technologyreview.com/news/519336/bruce-schneier-nsa-spyingis-making-us-less-safe/ (describing how the NSA might be attempting to secure cooperation with the
private sector for the implementation of unofficial "backdoor" surveillance programs).
39. See, e.g., Janine Hiller et al., Privacy and Security in the Implementation of Health
Information Technology (Electronic Health Records): U.S. and EU Compared, 17 B.U . J. SCI. &
TECH. L. 1, 15-16 (2011) (exploring the ethical aspects of electronic information collection and
sharing in the healthcare industry) ; Anjanette Raymond, The Dilemma of Private Justice Systems:
Big Data Sources, the Cloud and Predictive Analytics, NW. J. INT' L L. & Bus. (forthcoming); John
W. Bagby, Using an Industrial Organization (/10) Lens to Enhance Predictive Analytics:
Disentangling Emerging Relationships in the Electronic Surveillance Supply Chain (forthcoming);
Philip Nichols, The Biggest Data of All: Preparing for and Preventing Corruption in Algorithmic
Healthcare (forthcoming) .
40. For example, a defendant in a recent case decided in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit raised efficacy and Daubert concerns over secret mass cybersurveillance programs operated
by naval intelligence in a criminal prosecution . See, e.g., United States v. Dreyer, 767 F3d 826,828
n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Dreyer challenges the admission of evidence related to RoundUp [mass
cybersurveillance program], arguing it did not meet the requirements for the admission of expert
testimony established by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)."). The Court did not
reach the Daubert issue because it found in favor of Dreyer on other grounds. Id.
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discussion of their scientific methods and the empirical evaluation or
scientific testing, if any, of such methods .
Further, it is useful to note that while other fields may enjoy more
certainty in their conclusions, a deep interrogation of the scientific
underpinnings of covert cybersurveillance methods requires speculation.
This analysis, as I have previously stated, is meant to engage the entire
concerned community and those who are certainly more informed. The
analysis is not intended to invite concrete conclusions. From an academic
research perspective, it is practically impossible to interrogate these secret
methods without a degree of speculation.
Despite the speculative aspects of this research, the potential legal and
other consequences of this topic cannot be overemphasized. The scientific
inquiry in the homeland security and national security context, like the
evidentiary and criminal procedure contexts, is integral to understanding
whether specific rights are protected or not.41 As science has played an everexpanding role in determining liability or guilt in both our civil and criminal
justice system, courts increasingly recognized the need to anchor the
introduction of such evidence upon sound scientific principles.42 This
Article proposes that, similarly, if data science and big data tools are
increasingly used in the intelligence and national security programs and
policies, scientific validity determinations should be sought prior to the
implementation of these emerging cybersurveillance and dataveillance
methods.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Following Part I, this introduction,
in Parts II through IV, I discuss important background information, intended
to frame the analysis and set the factual and legal predicate necessary for
future scholarship. Specifically, in Part II, I first offer a brief definition of
"small data" and "big data." Next, I will briefly summarize small data
surveillance methods and then contrast small data surveillance with big data
cybersurveillance-a "collect-it-all" approach to intelligence gathering that
41. See, e .g., Elizabeth E . Joh, Policing by the Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment,
89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56 (2014) (questioning, for example, "whether predictive software based on
historical crime data is similar to other uses of third party information that have already been held to
support a reasonable suspicion determination."); Shayana Kadidal, NSA Surveillance: The
Implications for Civil Liberties, 10 US: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 433, 469- 70 (2014)
(recognizing the role of effectiveness and ineffectiveness in the arguments of the government
regarding what extent Fourth Amendment and Fourth Amendment-like analysis should be
considered in surveillance) .
42. See, e.g ., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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is facilitated by bulk data collection, and mass cybersurveillance and
dataveillance programs. Finally, I will provide a brief overview of the
landmark case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,43 and its
relationship to a tradition of scientific interrogation in the evidentiary
context. I recognize that Daubert currently plays no role in the Fourth
Amendment44 jurisprudence in evaluating the constitutionality of
surveillance tools. Yet, to the extent that newly emerging big data
cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance tools are dependent upon data
science, I suggest that a Daubert-type analysis may be helpful to an analysis
of these new surveillance methods.
Next, Part III specifically focuses on private and public dataficationthe process of transitioning all human-generated data into digital forms that
can be indexed and stored indefinitely. This, as Part III will discuss,
facilitates the datafication of the body and biometric surveillance (i .e ., 24/7
surveillance of the body), and the datafication or comprehensive surveillance
of behavioral, biographical, and other personally identifiable information
(i.e ., 360° surveillance of the biography).
Although technical, this
discussion is critical in that it shows why data science reasoning and big data
policy rationales appear to be both operative and persuasive in a "collect-itall" approach to intelligence gathering.
Part IV will strive to explain how big data cybersurveillance tools
appear to function to fuse biometric data (e.g., surveillance of the body) with
biographic and behavioral data (e.g., surveillance of the biography) to
construct digital avatars from our digital selves. Additionally, Part IV
explores the virtual reality dimension of the construction of digital avatars
and potential scientific limits of a "collect-it-all" approach to intelligence
gathering that is big data dependent, given the inherent limitations of big
data tools.
Part V concludes that the Daubert analyses, now embedded within the
judicial oversight function, initiated a close interrogation of the scientific
reasoning and scientific method underlying a proposed piece of evidence as
a way to assess whether that evidence should have a legal consequence in a
43. Id.
44. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV .
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civil or criminal trial context. If the intelligence community is currently
presuming the efficacy and the scientific validity of "collect-it-all" methods,
and is allowed to implement these tools without the benefit of a careful
scientific-driven inquiry, then the imposition of a Daubert-type evidentiary
burden is appropriate. In other words, the discussion below will attempt to
illustrate why a Daubert-type inquiry may be helpful in conceptualizing the
proper analytical structure necessary for the assessment and oversight of big
data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance methods.
II. BACKGROUND ON BIG DATA AND BIG DATA CYBERSURVEILLANCE:
WHY EXAMINING DAUBERT AND DATA SCIENCE MATTERS

Parts II, III, and IV of this Article, in more technical and specific detail,
attempt to address a subject that is gaining importance both as a matter of
law and a matter of democratic govemance45 : exactly how and why small
data surveillance is significantly distinct from big data cybersurveillance in
the intelligence gathering context. Today, at the earliest dawn of big data, it
is difficult to ascertain the efficacy of government-driven big data
cybersurveillance tools in the national security context.46 It is now openly

45. Journalist and attorney Glenn Greenwald, and journalist and documentary filmmaker Laura
Poitras-who reportedly exercise sole possession over the full Snowden files-and other
surveillance experts have shared the view that the Snowden disclosures profoundly implicate
questions of democratic governance . See, e.g., George Packer, The Holder of Secrets: Laura
Poitras's Closeup View of Edward Snowden, NEW YORKER (Oct. 20, 2014), available at
http://www .newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/20/holder-secrets; GREENWALD, supra note 1, at 6
("[Snowden] has made it clear, with these disclosures, that we stand at a historic crossroads. Will
the digital age usher in the individual liberation and political freedoms that the Internet is uniquely
capable of unleashing? Or will it bring about a system of omnipresent monitoring and
control . .. ?"); LAURA POITRAS, CITIZENFOUR (2014); Peter Maass, The lntercept's Laura Poitras
Wins Academy Award for 'Citizen/our' , INTERCEPT (Feb. 22, 2014), available at
https ://first! ook .org/theintercept/2015/02/22/poi tras-w ins-oscar-for-ci tizenfour/ (" 'The di sci osures
that Edward Snowden revealed don ' t only expose a threat to our privacy but to our democracy
itself,' Poitras said in her acceptance speech [at the 87th Academy Awards, immediately after Poitras
received the Oscar for Best Documentary Feature for directing CITIZENFOUR] ."); RACHEL
LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH
AMERICANS' DATA 9 (2013) ("The collection and retention of non-criminal information about
Americans for law enforcement and national security purposes poses profound challenges to our
democracy and our liberties.").
46. See PEI'ER BERGEN, DAVID STERMAN, EMILY SCHNEIDER & BAILEY CAHALL, NEW
AMERICA FOUNDATION, Do NSA's BULK SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS STOP TERRORISTS? (2014)
available at http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Bergen_NAF_NSA %
20Surveillance_l_O.pdf ) (arguing that "traditional" investigative tools like the use of informants
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debated whether and to what extent emerging bulk collection capacities, as
well as big data's mass integrative and predictive technologies, can
effectively advance important national security objectives.47 Regardless of
whether bulk data collection, mass surveillance programs, and big data
cybersurveillance tools have been adequately evaluated, it appears that these
emerging surveillance methods are being rapidly tested and deployed amidst
what has been termed the "big data revolution."48
As will be discussed more fully below, the NSA cybersurveillance
programs revealed by the Snowden disclosures and other recent public
reports shed light on a "collect-it-all" approach to intelligence gathering. I
argue that more fully examining this "collect-it-all" approach and its
implications in a big data world context reinforces the critical need for a
Daubert-type inquiry of these emerging surveillance technologies. In order
to comprehend why such an inquiry of these technologies under a Daubert
analysis might be necessary, some of the critical distinctions between small
data surveillance and big data cybersurveillance must be more clearly
understood.
have been the primary method used by the NSA in counterterrorism operations in the past) .
47. Several recent reports, conducted by both the public and nonprofit sectors, have investigated
the efficacy of several of the programs revealed by the Snowden disclosures. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
CLARKE, MICHAEL J. MORRELL, GEOFFREY R. STONE, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & PETER SWIRE, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT' S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD (2013),
available at https://www .whi tehouse .gov /sites/defaul t/files/docs/2013-12- l 2_rg_final_report.pdf;
PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS
OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014), available at https://www .pclob.gov/
library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf; PRivACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION
702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014), available at https://www .pclob.gov
/library/702-Report.pdf; PETER BERGEN ET AL., supra note 46; LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 45.
In addition, several media outlets have provided for an open debate on this issue and other issues
related to the Snowden disclosures . See, e.g., Jennifer Stisa Granick & Christoper Jon Sprigman,
The Criminal N.SA ., N .Y . TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www .nytimes .com/2013/06/28/opinion/thecriminal-nsa.html ("If all data is 'relevant,' it makes a mockery of the already shaky concept of
relevance ."); Bruce Schneier, NSA Surveillance: A Guide to Staying Secure, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance
(''The NSA has turned the fabric of the internet into a vast surveillance platform, but they are not
magical."); Glyn Moody, The Repeated Failure of the US and UK Governments' "Add More Hay"
Approach to Surveillance, TECHDIRT (Dec. 3 , 2014), https://www .techdirt.com/articles/20141201/09
320729286/repeated-failure-us-uk-governments-add-more-hay-approach-to-surveillance.shtml.
48. Several scholars and experts have referred to the big data phenomenon as a "revolution."
See, e.g ., MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4.
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A. Big Data v. Small Data

The big data revolution is presenting new challenges to a variety of
disciplines, and understanding the highly technical nature of the topic has
become essential to properly understanding the implications of big data's
impact on the law and constitutional analyses.49 Similarly, to understand a
legal challenge to the scientific validity of data science evidence and other
evidence dependent upon applications of big data, first, the meaning of the
term and phenomenon of big data itself must be explored. Only through
exploration of this highly technical topic can a fuller and more informed
statutory and constitutional inquiry be realized. The discussion below will
serve several purposes. First, for this Article, it sets a definitional and
descriptive baseline necessary for understanding the applicability of a
Daubert-type evaluative framework to these new technologies. Second, it
will also endeavor to build the foundation for future scholarship, and a more
thorough statutory and constitutional discussion.
To help understand the significance of how big data is transforming
intelligence gathering, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier
anchor the paradigmatic nature of big data by contrasting the conception of a
"small data world" with a newly emerging conception of a "big data
world."50 Likewise, for this Article, I have selected a small data world
versus big data world framework of analysis to compare and contrast the
significant differences between how surveillance methods operate in a small
data world versus how surveillance methods now appear to operate in a big
data world.

49. Roughly speaking, big data, as an evolving field of research and academic study, appears to
involve, for example, the interrogation of a new science (i .e ., what has been termed "data science" or
"big data science" and "big data engineering"); newly emerging big data tools and methods (e .g.,
capturing, storing, and analyzing the data generated by the Internet and Social-Mobile-Cloud
technologies); big data products (e .g., interoperability among databases, big data mass integration,
big data visualization and data pattern mapping, results of predictive analytics, etc .); frameworks for
guiding or managing big data (e.g ., big data ethics, big data protocols to maintain data integrity) ; big
data end results (e.g., benefits to other knowledge and science pursuits like epidemiology, delivery
of consumer services, improvement of decisionmaking in the public or private sectors, etc.) ; and the
unintended consequences of big data (e.g., discriminatory inferences and disparate impact), to
identify just a few sub-categories of big data inquiry .
50. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 13.
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1. What is Big Data?
What is big data? According to some, "big data is revolutionizing 21st
century business without anybody knowing what it actually means."51
Jonathan Stuart Ward and Adam Barker, thus, recognize that there is a "big
data conundrum": Scholars and experts agree there is presently no working
definition of the term "big data." 52 Ward and Barker have attempted to craft
a definition that "they hope everyone can agree on." 53 That definition is as
follows: "Big data is a term describing the storage and analysis of large or
complex data sets using a series of techniques[.]" 54 Julie Cohen extends the
big data definition further:
"Big Data" is shorthand for the combination of a technology and a
process.
The technology is a configuration of informationprocessing hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating
vast quantities of data in very short times. The process involves
mining the data for patterns, distilling the patterns into predictive
analytics, and applying the analytics to new data.55
Other scholars and experts explain that, '"Big Data' is a generalized,
imprecise term that refers to the use of large data sets in data science and
predictive analytics ."'56
The most widely-recognized definition of big data is commonly
anchored by several data-specific characteristics, often referred to as the "3V s" of big data: volume, velocity, and variety .57 "Technologists often use
the technical '3-V' definition of big data as 'high-volume, high-velocity and
high-variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms
of information processing for enhanced insight and decision making."'58
51. The Big Data Conundrum: How to Define It? , MIT TECH. REV . (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www .te
chnologyreview .com/view/519851/the-big-data-conundrum-how-to-define-it/ [hereinafter Big Data
Conundrum].
52. Id.
53 . Id.
54. Id.
55. Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARv . L.REv . 1904, 1920-21 (2013) .
56. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 10, at 96 (2014) .
57. Id.
58. Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393 , 394
n.3 (2014) (quoting IT Glossary: Big Data, GARTNER, http://www .gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/
(last visited May 11, 2015)) ; see id. (citing the original "3-V" big data report, DOUG LANEY, 3D
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Increasingly, experts note that a fourth "V" of big data involves the veracity
or reliability of the underlying data.59 Still other experts, such as Rob
Kitchin, have identified additional data-specific characteristics of big data,
including: "exhaustive in scope, striving to capture entire populations of
systems; fine-grained resolution, aiming at maximum detail, while being
indexical in identification; relational, with common fields that enable the
conjoining of different data-sets; flexible, with traits of extensionality (easily
adding new fields) and scalability (the potential to expand rapidly)." 60
Additionally, and highly relevant to the inquiry of this Article, the
federal government has recently adopted several definitions of big data. For
example, the White House has recently described big data and its
implications in its report Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving
Values, 61 often referred to as the "Podesta Report," as the report's inquiry
was led by John Podesta, Counselor to the President.62 The Podesta Report
quotes a National Science Foundation document, titled Core Techniques and
Technologies for Advancing Big Data Science & Engineering, stating: "Big
datasets are 'large, diverse, complex, longitudinal, and/or distributed
datasets generated from instruments, sensors, Internet transactions, email,
video, click streams, and/or all other digital sources available today and in
the future ."'63 The National Institute of Standards and Technology explains
further that big data '"exceed(s) the capacity or capability of current or

DATA MANAGEMENT: CONTROLLING DATA VOLUME, VELOCITY, AND VARIEfY (2001), available at
http://biogs .gartner .com/doug-laney /files/2012/0 l/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-V
olume-Velocity-and-Variety .pelf) .
59. Big Data Conundrum, supra note 51 ("In 2001, a Meta (now Gartner) report noted the
increasing size of data, the increasing rate at which it is produced and the increasing range of formats
and representations employed. This report predated the term 'big data' but proposed a three-fold
definition encompassing the 'three Vs': Volume, Velocity and Variety. This idea has since become
popular and sometimes includes a fourth V: veracity, to cover questions of trust and uncertainty .") .
60. Lyon, Snowden, supra note 3, at 5 (citing the work of Rob Kitchin); see also KITCHIN, supra
note 4.
61. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES
(2014) [hereinafter PODESTA REPORT] , available at https://www .whitehouse.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/docs/big_data_pri vacy_report_may _1_2014.pdf.
62. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES, INTERIM PROGRESS REPORT (2015), available at https://www .whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/20150204_Big_Data_Seizing_Opportunities_Preserving_ Values_Memo.pdf.
63. PODESTA REPORT, supra note 61 , at 3 (quoting NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION,
SOLICITATION 12-499, CORE TECHNIQUES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR ADVANCING BIG DATA SCIENCE
& ENGINEERING (2012), available athttp://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2012/nsf12499/nsf12499.htm).
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conventional methods and systems ."' 64 "In other words, the notion of 'big'
is relative to the current standard of computation."65
The word "big" in the term "big data," however, is misleading.66 In
another recent White House report, Big Data and Privacy: A Technological
Perspective, submitted by the President's Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology, the Council explains that big data is not only about size,
but also about new forms of knowledge creation, data-driven
decisionmaking, and the inferences that can be supported by analytics.67
"Big data is big in two different senses. It is big in the quantity and variety
of data that are available to be processed. And, it is big in the scale of
analysis (termed 'analytics') that can be applied to those data, ultimately to
make inferences and draw conclusions."68 Moreover, most experts agree
that big data relies upon supercomputing and machine learning or artificial
intelligence tools and, therefore, by its very definition, big data exceeds the
ability of human capacities to make sense of the "big data" without the
assistance of algorithmic tools and other computer-enabled devices. 69
Who are the predominant drivers and users of big data today? Dave
Farber, the "Grandfather of the Internet," claims that there are currently two
prevalent users of big data: corporations and government agencies.70 Both of
these users appear to exploit big data, but for different ends. "First,

64. Big Data Conundrum, supra note 51.
65. Id. (emphasis omitted).
66. "The MIKE [Method for an Integrated Knowledge Environment] project argues that big data
is not a function of the size of a data set but its complexity. Consequently, it is the high degree of
permutations and interactions within a data set that defines big data." Id.
67. PCAST REPORT, supra note 20.
68. Id. at ix.
69. See, e.g., MAYER-SCH<'.'.>NBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 11-12 ("Though it is described
as part of the branch of computer science called artificial intelligence, and more specifically, an area
called machine learning, this characterization is misleading. Big data is not trying to ' teach' a
computer to ' think' like humans . Instead, it' s about applying math to huge quantities of data in order
to infer probabilities[.]").
70. John Horgan, U.S. Never Really Ended Creepy "Total Information Awareness" Program,
SCI. AM. (June 7, 2013), http://blogs .scientificamerican.com/cross-check/2013/06/07/u-s-neverreally-ended-creepy-total-information-awareness-program/ ("Farber recalled that shortly after 9/11,
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency initiated 'Total Information Awareness,' a
surveillance program that called for recording and analyzing all digital information generated by all
U.S . citizens .... After news reports provoked criticism of the Darpa program, it was officially
discontinued. But Farber suspected that [Snowden disclosures] new surveillance programs represent
a continuation of Total Information Awareness. 'I can't get anyone to deny that there's a common
thread there,' he said.").
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corporations can analyze the data for commercially beneficial insights .
Second, government agencies can examine the data for evidence that you are
engaged in suspicious activities ." 71
This Article contends, based on publicly available information, that it
appears that in intelligence gathering, the government believes that it can
and should exploit big data tools in the same manner as the private sector.72
Unlike the private sector, the government must provide a legal basis for
mass data collection. According to the government, the statutory basis for
bulk telephony metadata collection, for example, derives from Section 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorizes the following collection: "any
tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other
items)[.]"73 These "tangible things", however, must be "relevant to an
authorized investigation ... [to] protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities ." 74 The government has successfully
argued in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that bulk collection of
data is necessary ex ante under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The
bulk telephony metadata program provides the government with an
aggregate of data (e.g., metadata on all phone calls collected from Verizon
on a daily basis, thus, allowing the NSA to collect the "phone records of
millions of Verizon customers daily"), 75 and then, once the bulk data is
amassed, allows the intelligence community to query a specific identifier
within the aggregated database once the relevance of data to an ongoing
investigation is established.76
As will be discussed in more detail below, whether bulk telephony
metadata collection under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act is

71. Id.
72 . See, e.g., Ira "Gus" Hunt, Presentation at Gigaom Structure Data Conference: The CIA's
"Grand Challenges" with Big Data (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Hunt CIA Presentation] (video and
transcript available at https://gigaom .com/2013/03/20/even-the-cia-is-struggling-to-deal-with-the-vol
ume-of-real-time-social-data).
73 . USA PATRIOT Act§ 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(l) (2012) .
74. Id. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2012) .
75. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-veriz
on-court-order.
76. See, e.g., Slobogin, Cause To Believe What, supra note 1 (citing In re Application of the
F Bl.for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things BR 13-109, 22 (FISA Ct. July 29, 2013)
and the USA PATRIOT Act§ 215, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861 (a)(l), (b)(2)(A) (2012)).
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constitutional is unresolved. 77 In challenges filed immediately after the
Snowden disclosures, federal courts are now attempting to resolve whether
the NSA's bulk telephony metadata collection program is consistent with
constitutional protections such as the Fourth Amendment's proscription
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2 . What is Small Data?
What is small data? Prior to the onset of big data, such a definition was
never necessary, as all data at that time would now be considered small by
today's comparison. Consequently, at the earliest dawn of the big data
revolution, there is no agreed-upon definition on what is "small data."
However, "[g]enerally, small data is thought of as solving discrete questions
with limited and structured data, and the data are generally controlled by one
institution."78 Explained another way, small data is the world that we think
we know 79 : a universe of knowledge that humans can see, touch, analyze,
and perceive without the assistance of supercomputing capabilities.
Often, common definitions of a big data set as a necessary prerequisite
that a data set have advanced computing storage and processing capacity in
order for the data to be sufficiently big enough to qualify as "big data."
Almost invariably, big data expressly or implicitly precludes human storage
and processing capacity-if a human can comprehend the data without
computing and algorithmic assistance, it is not big data. As a result, a small
data world involves things that humans can create and grasp using human
judgment alone. A big data world is a world filled with big data-driven
knowledge and big data products that a human could not perceive using
human judgment alone.
Because of its transformative potential, Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier
and others have explained that the movement away from a small data world
and towards a big data world is properly characterized as a "revolution."80
Like the industrial revolution, big data signals a historically significant
methodological and philosophical shift in how we approach and perceive
information, and what we accept as efficiencies of decisionmaking and
77. See infra Part II .D.
78. Ferguson, supra note 2, at 329 n.6 (citing JULES J . BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF BIG DATA:
PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION 1-2 (2013)).

79. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 17-18.
80. Id.
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production.81 Unlike the industrial revolution, however, the big data
revolution is taking place in the midst of what has been termed the
"Information Society"82 or the digital age. Therefore, as danah boyd and
Kate Crawford explain, big data creates new forms of knowledge and the
processes by which we produce knowledge and perception.83 Cohen builds
on this concept of big data as a device of knowledge creation: "Together, the
technology and the process [of big data] comprise a technique for converting
data flows into a particular, highly data-intensive type of knowledge." 84
Grappling with why and how small data knowledge is distinct from big
data knowledge, therefore, is essential to understanding how small data
surveillance and intelligence gathering is fundamentally different from big
data surveillance and intelligence gathering.
B. Small Data Surveillance Methods v. Big Data Cybersurveillance
Methods
The distinction between small data surveillance methods and big data
methods is critically important legally and scientifically. It is important
legally because human intelligence is the foundational bulwark for
investigative inquiries for law enforcement or intelligence-gathering
organizations that ask: who is a suspect, what is reasonable suspicion, etc.85
Because the data that can be gathered has changed (e.g., bulk telephony
metadata or Internet term-selector queries) and methods for gathering that
81. See Lyon, supra note 3, at 6.
82. One definition of "global information society" offers the following description: "[Global
Information Society"] recognizes that science and technology co-exist in a world where technology
diminishes geographic, temporal, social, and national barriers to discovery, access, and use of data."
REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON DIGITAL DATA TO THE COMMITTEE ON
SCIENCE OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL 17 (2009) available at
https://www .whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/opengov_inbox/hamessing_power_web.pdf.
83. danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural,
Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & Soc'y 662, 662- 79 (2012).
84. Cohen, supra note 55 .
85. See, e.g., OFACE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES (REDACTED) (2005),
available at http://wwwJustice .gov/oig/special/0509/chapter3 .htm ("Human sources are vitally
important to our success against terrorists and criminals . They often give us critical intelligence and
information we could not obtain in other ways, opening a window into our adversaries' plans and
capabilities. Human sources can mean the difference between the FBI preventing an act of terrorism
or crime, or reacting to an incident after the fact." (quoting Dir. Robert Mueller, Fed. Bureau of
Investigation)) .
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data have changed (e.g., seeking all metadata located on telecommunications
servers or directly tapping cables), traditional legal concepts guiding the
constitutionality of new intelligence technologies must be reexamined.
Human intelligence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment analysis,
but in a big data world, human intelligence and judgment is at risk of
becoming marginalized.86
1.

Small Data Surveillance Methods

Small data policing87 and small data surveillance88 traditionally relied
upon human perception and analysis, and the sensory-based tools and
physical-based evidence of a non-digitalized world. In a small data world,
as a matter of technological limitation, methods of law enforcement
investigation and intelligence gathering historically relied upon human
intelligence, including human sensory perception analysis, and other
communication gathering and analytic methods that depended upon human
judgment and human decisionmaking; traditional evidence based upon
analog data and paper-based files; traditional intelligence collection
methods, such as traditional signals intelligence and other traditional
communications interception; and other data analytic tools that centered
upon traditional research approaches, such as hypothesis-driven methods.
The term "small data surveillance" has not been formally defined .
However, in this Article, the term is used as a way to mark a contrast
between traditional intelligence gathering methods (i.e., "small data
surveillance") and newly emerging intelligence methods that are digitally
data-driven, dependent upon supercomputing capacities, and capitalize on
86 . See Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note 1. Professor Laura Donohue recognized
the need for a Fourth Amendment analysis, as well as the tension that exists when collecting
programs are either seemingly performing the analysis themselves or are not fully understood such
that human analysts can properly dispel Fourth Amendment concerns. See id. ("[l]t appears that
neither the NSA nor FISC had an adequate understanding of how the algorithms operate. Nor did
they understand the type of information that had been incorporated into different databases, and
whether they had been subjected to the appropriate legal analysis before data mining."); see also
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.") .
87. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 2, at 340 (recognizing that a small data world included
investigation through physical means, such as an officer's notice of a suspect's "observable actions,"
i.e., presence in a high crime neighborhood, standing on a street comer, etc .).
88. See, e.g ., CLARK, supra note 3; WALLACE & MELTON, supra note 3 .
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big data phenomena and tools (i .e ., "big data cybersurveillance") . As
technology has transformed the Information Society, surveillance methods
have necessarily transformed as well. As David Lyon has explained, "[A]s
political-economic and socio-technological circumstances change, so
surveillance also undergoes alteration, sometimes transformation ." 89
The characteristic that helps to define the transformational nature of big
data technologies is the predictive aspects of the data-driven knowledge.
Therefore, a core distinction that separates small data surveillance from big
data cybersurveillance is the fact that, historically, information gathering
was of an ex post nature, not an ex ante nature. 90 Jack Balkin elaborates this
point: "Older models of law enforcement have focused on apprehension and
prosecution of wrongdoers after the fact and the threat of criminal or civil
sanctions to deter future bad behavior. The National Surveillance State
supplements this model of prosecution and deterrence with technologies of
prediction and prevention."91
Concurrent with that shift in focus from ex post to ex ante is an
exponential growth in the need for data to be analyzed.92 Ex post
information can be limited and focused on specific suspects and events that
have triggered the need for the surveillance. Ex ante surveillance seeks to
discover suspects before they become suspicious, so to speak, and seeks to
identify future events before they occur in order to intervene beforehand.93
Doing this requires-and is facilitated by-the datification of reality in a big
data world. In other words, big data cybersurveillance tools appear to be
radically changing what the government considers to be the full body of
evidence that allows for the careful examination of security- and defensedriven inquiries.94

89. Lyon, supra note 3, at 2; see also Balkin, National Surveillance State, supra note 14; Balkin
& Levinson, supra note 14; Murphy, supra note 14; CLARK, supra note 3; WALLACE & MELTON,

supra note 3.
90. Balkin, National Surveillance State, supra note 14, at 10-11 ("Governance in the National
Surveillance State is increasingly statistically oriented, and preventative, rather than focused on
deterrence and ex post prosecution of individual wrongdoing.").
91. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted) (citing Scott Charney, The Internet, Law Enforcement, and
Security, in 2 PRACTICING L. INST., FIFTH ANNUAL LAW INSTITUTE 943--44 (Ian C. Ballon et al.
eds., 2001)).
92. See Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data
Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013).
93 . See Balkin, National Surveillance State, supra note 14, at 15-16.
94. See Hu, supra note 18, at 1479--80 (describing recently introduced forms of "biometric ID
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A primary significance of these distinctions is that, in a big data world,
the investigative method has been flipped on its head. Ira "Gus" Hunt, Chief
Technology Officer of the CIA, explains why the investigative process has
been flipped upside down:
When I started as analyst years ago inside the CIA, the world was
pretty simple. It was the world of the few to the many in terms of
information flows .. .. The Social Mobile Cloud world has
completely inverted that model and has gone to this complex manyto-many model .95
He further suggests that, because of the inversion of information flows
resulting from a big data world, the nature of the investigatory inquiry has
flipped upside down as well . He specifically elaborates that in a small data
world, you "move data to the question" 96 (e.g., start with the question or
hypothesis and then assess the small data evidence that may be available to
assist in the inquiry through human judgment and human evaluative
processes). In direct contrast, in a big data world, you "move the question to
the data" 97 (e.g., start with the big data evidence that has been amassed and
that is available for technologically-derived insights, and then assess the
question or hypothesis that might be illuminated by the data through big data
tools-data mining and pattern-based analysis, database screening, statistical
modeling and algorithms, predictive analytics, or other supercomputing
capacities and artificial intelligence tools).
Put another way, it appears that in a small data world, investigators start
with a thesis or a suspect and build evidence that allows for the gathering of
small data evidence that is capable of supporting a conclusion: whether the
arrest and prosecution of an individual is warranted. The question (e.g., who
is a suspect and is there evidence that he or she committed the crime) leads
to the gathering of evidence that can support the conviction. The
government asks whether the evidence can responsibly support government
surveillance").
95. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72.
96. Within Hunt's PowerPoint slides, he includes one titled, "Tectonic Technology Shifts." The
slide juxtaposes "Traditional Processing" and "Mass Analytics/Big Data." Under 'Traditional
Processing" of data, Hunt identifies "Move Data to Question" as a characteristic of small data. Id.
97. Within Hunt's PowerPoint slides, he includes one titled, "Tectonic Technology Shifts." The
slide juxtaposes "Traditional Processing" and "Mass Analytics/Big Data."
Under "Mass
Analytics/Big Data," Hunt identifies "Move Question to Data" as a characteristic of big data. Id.
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action (e.g., a warrant, an arrest, a prosecution) premised upon the evidence
(e.g., fingerprints, witnesses, etc .) .
By contrast, in a big data world, it appears that investigators and
analysts start with the data. Presumably, in the case of the intelligence
communities within the government, in a big data world these programs
function to gather the data in order to begin formulating questions. Instead
of forming a thesis about who committed a crime that has already occurred,
big data can be accumulated and analyzed to allow the formulation of theses
about who is likely to commit a criminal or terrorist act before any event.98
The thesis can be probabilistic in nature, with the presumption that the
broader the array of data analyzed or scope of data integrated, the more
accurate the data analytic or algorithmic results will become. Statistically
speaking, the predictive "thesis" appears to be true. In such a situation,
preemptive action may appear to be justified in the eyes of the government.99
Perhaps problematically, it also appears that such a thesis would not be
subject to rigorous scientific inquiry. In a small data world, statistics are
often taken for granted as being scientifically valid.
2 . Big Data Cybersurveillance and Mass Dataveillance Methods
As we transition from a small data world to a big data world, it appears
that the government may be at the earliest stages of attempting to merge
small data evidence and big data evidence for prosecutorial purposes .100 The
inquiry starts with the collection of all available digitalized data in the hope
that the data will lead the government to its aspiration-the discovery of the
categories or sub-categories of individuals considered suspect-and,
consequently, may facilitate the digital construction of the data patterns and
98. See Elizabeth E . Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 35, 42-48 (2014).
99. See, e.g., Jennifer C . Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV . 327 (2014); JENNIFER BACHNER, PREDICTIVE POLICING:
PREVENTING CRIME WITH DATA AND ANALYTICS 14 (2013) ("The fundamental notion underlying
the theory and practice of predictive policing is that we can make probabilistic inferences about
future criminal activity based on existing data.").
100. See, e.g., Balkin, National Surveillance State, supra note 14; Daskal, supra note 99;
Ferguson, supra note 2, at 330 ("At some point inference from this personal data (independent of the
observation) may become sufficiently individualized and predictive to justify the seizure of a
suspect[,]" and "[t]he next phase will use existing predictive analytics to target suspects without any
firsthand observation of criminal activity, relying instead on the accumulation of data points ."); see
also, e.g., BACHNER, supra note 99, at 6.
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data analyses that can justify the thesis. 101 Put differently, in a small data
world, the accumulation of data in response to a thesis enables the
government to drill down vertically on a particular suspect or terrorist
target. 102 The vertical collection of data is accumulated to isolate the key
pieces of fact that can prove or disprove the thesis .103 The vertical nature of
small data investigations allows the investigator to drill down on one suspect
at a time to extract the relevant data from a mass of seemingly irrelevant
data.
In a big data world, by contrast, data science logic and big data
policymaking rationales demand a panoramic vision of all the data in order
to see the patterns and tendencies which can make visible and corroborate
theories about who is predisposed to criminal or terrorist behaviors.' 04 To
explain further, big data analytics and bulk data collection techniqueswhich have led to the government's impulse to "collect everything and hang
on to it 'forever"' 105 -allow the intelligence community to use inferential
knowledge to digitally construct potential threats "virtually" in order to flip
"virtual" suspects from a horizontal data position (e.g., "collect-it-all" and
"everybody is a target") into a vertical data position (e.g., drilling down on
any potential suspect or specific target at any given moment that the
government deems necessary to preempt actual or algorithmically
understood threats) .106
In a small data world, resource and technological constraints restricted
the government to the investigation of individual suspects. 107 Suspects were

101. See sources cited supra note 100.
102. See BACHNER, supra note 99, at 24 ("The social network analysis allowed the detective on
the case 'to efficiently and effectively move his personnel resources to strategically navigate the
suspect into the hands of the police ."') .
103 . See, e .g., Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 1; Ferguson, supra note 2; WALTER
L. PERRY ET AL., RAND CORP., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 11-13 (2013), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pub
s/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233 .pdf (discussing the use of data in predictive
policing).
104. See Joh, supra note 98, at 42-46 .
105. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72.
106. See, e.g., Lyon, Snowden, supra note 3 ; Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 1;
Ferguson, supra note 2; PERRY ET AL., supra note 103, at 67 . This method has allowed the Memphis
Police Department to use big data and "respond to predicted threats before a criminal act is
committed ." PERRY ET AL., supra note 103, at 67.
107. Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REV . 1083, 1149-51 (2002) ; see also Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables
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identified through small data methods, for example, the utilization of
sensory-based tools and analog-based investigatory methods . As has been
well-documented, human misconceptions of a perceived threat, such as
racial profiling, and human fallibility, such as faulty eyewitness reporting or
inaccurate human intelligence, have led to false targeting. 108
In a big data world, however, the resource and technological limitations
on the government no longer impose inherent restraints on surveillance as in
the past. 109 Resource and technological innovation facilitates mass, dragnet
surveillance of millions and potentially billions of individuals. 110 This, in
tum, enables the potential digital investigation of anyone who engages in
electronic communications and, consequently, allows for the construction of
the digital avatars of potentially millions and billions of individuals. Big
data precrime or preterrorism initiatives are seemingly justified by the
statistically-driven evidence.'"
Human biases can be embedded in
algorithms, and human misconceptions of a perceived threat can be
translated into technological methods for intelligence gathering and
automated or semi-automated decisionmaking. 112 The contrast in scale also
distinguishes the scale of human misconceptions and human fallibility. The
creation of artificial intelligence targeting systems that embed
misconceptions and fallibilities can lead to potentially thousands and
millions of false suspects .113
Thus, both human small data-driven intelligence and big data-driven
intelligence are subject to error. Although most understand human frailty
and human fallibility in intelligence gathering, at the earliest stages of the
big data revolution perhaps it is more difficult to concede big data is
susceptible to frailties and fallibilities of its own kind .

and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE LJ. ONLINE
335 (2014) .
108. See, e.g ., TOMR. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 117 (1990).
109. Bankston & Soltani, supra note 107, at 335.
110. See GREENWALD, supra note 1; ANGWIN, supra note 1.
111. See, e.g ., PERRY Er AL., supra note 103, at 2-3.
112. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH . U. L. REV. 1249, 1260-61
(2008); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 10, at 1 (discussing the use of big data to create algorithms to
assess people) .
113. Bruce Schneier, Why Data Mining Won't Stop Terror, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2006),
http://archive.wired.com/po1itics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/03/70357?currentPage=
all (noting that a 99% accurate system would "generate 1 billion false alarms for every real terrorist
plot it uncovers") .
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C. Daubert and Data Science
Beyond differences in language and terminology in big data discussions,
there does not appear to be widespread recognition of a necessary scientific
interrogation of big data-driven programs, though such a tradition of
scientific critique has a long-standing existence in other forms in the legal
realm. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 114 the Supreme Court
handed down a landmark ruling concerning the standard for admitting expert
scientific testimony in a federal trial. 115 In a broader sense, however, the
Court reinforced the idea that where scientific evidence is concerned-and
prior to its admission into a trial where it can have legal consequences-it
should be "not only relevant, but reliable." 116 In such a circumstance where
reliability is in question, the judge, through application of Daubert, provides
a gatekeeping function intended to protect the trial and ultimately the rights
of individuals in the trial from inaccurate factual judgments derived from
unreliable influences. 117
In the context of admission of such evidence, the Daubert Court
interpreted the term "scientific," to "impl [y] a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science," and the term "knowledge" to "[connote] more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation," but instead to apply to "any
body of known facts or any body of ideas inferred from such facts or
accepted as truths on good grounds." 118 Indeed, Daubert recognized,
reliability of this type of evidence must be supported by "appropriate
validation." 119 Thus, the gatekeeping function of the judge that Daubert
prescribed is necessarily, in the case of scientific evidence, one grounded on
careful interrogation of evidence and scientific methodology .120 Daubert
itself notes that there are several questions that the judge should use to guide
their determination-such as whether the method producing the evidence

114. 509U.S.579(1993) .
115. Specifically, the Daubert Court agreed that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provided the
correct standard for scientific testimony admissible in trial. Id. at 587.
116. Id. at 589.
117. Id. at 597.
118. Id. at 590 (internal quotation omitted).
119. Id. at 590.
120. See, e.g., Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the
Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 99-100 (2012) (noting that Daubert and following
case law established guidelines to assess scientific validity, which "generated a sense that scientific
evidence required special attention and careful scrutiny").
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"can be (and has been) tested," 121 whether it has "been subjected to peer
review and publication," 122 whether it has a "known or potential rate of
error," 123 and if the methodology is generally accepted in the relevant
scientific community .124
In a criminal trial, where stakes can be high, the very design of trials and
the applicable rules that limit considerable evidence is "intended to protect
against unreliable evidence," and thus, "inaccurate factual judgments." 125
These factual judgments need such protection as Daubert provides,
undoubtedly, because these judgments are the foundation of verdicts that can
carry serious legal consequence for individuals.
Daubert instituted the close interrogation of both the scientific evidence
and the methods that underlie it before potential legal consequences can be
attached to an individual on the basis of the science and the scientific
evidence. 126
Daubert interrogations center upon the assurance of
"appropriate validation," 127 or, in other words, the efficacy of the particular
scientific method used pursuant to appropriate scientific standards. While in
application the assurance of scientific validity and efficacy is not always
perfect, the call for scrutiny of such evidence always remains. 128

121. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 .
122. Id.
123. Id. at 594.
124. Id. (noting that although the Frye standard of general acceptance is not determinative of
scientific evidence admissibility, it "can yet have a bearing on the inquiry").
125. Keith A . Findley, Judicial Gatekeeping of Suspect Evidence: Due Process and Evidentiary
Rules in the Age of Innocence , 47 GA. L. REV. 723, 729 (2013) (specifically discussing the
Confrontation Clause and its limits on admissible evidence based on constitutional principles).
126. See, e.g ., Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 120.
127. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
128. See, e.g., Rachel Dioso-Villa, Scientific and Legal Developments in Fire and Arson
Investigation Expertise in Texas v. Willingham, 14 MINN. J.L. Ser. & TECH. 817 (2013) (calling for
increased scrutiny on testimony and scientific evidence relating to arson); Simon A. Cole, More
Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L . &
CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005) (calling for increased scrutiny relating to fingerprint identification,
specifically articulating a need for error rate reform under Daubert); Eric Nielson, The Admission of
Scientific Evidence in a Post-Crawford World, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 951, 981 (2013) (calling
for an increase in scrutiny of lab reports under Daubert and concluding that the Crawford line of
cases does not adequately protect defendants from "shoddy work and practices [impersonating]
dependable science in our courts"); Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings:
Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SITTON HALL L. REV. 1125 (2003) (noting that the onset of
Daubert heightened judges' sensitivity to the need to scrutinize and likely led to the current climate
in which handwriting testimony is no longer universally admitted) .
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Individual criminal defendants, however, are not the only ones that
should be concerned with the efficacy and reliability of science used against
them. An explicit dialogue concerning the efficacy of these emerging mass
surveillance programs, and whether efficacy should be a part of a legal
analysis in deciding the constitutionality of these programs, should be
encouraged. 129 Surveillance programs operate on a clandestine level by
nature, and thus cannot be interrogated for scientific validity as the law
currently stands. FISA Courts, which are intended to operate as a check on
the usage of surveillance programs for particularized needs, are not publicly
accessible.130 A meaningful discussion on scientific validity may be
constrained due to the secret nature of these programs . Thus, the need for
such an interrogation itself may not be obvious. The close, Daubert-type
interrogation of the effectiveness of these programs and the methods behind
them is missing, allowing a sentiment that these programs' efficacy can be
assumed by both those that support such programs and those that oppose
them. 131 Arguably, however, concerns over the efficacy of these programs
influence the legal analysis of some jurists faced with the question of the
constitutionality of these secret programs. 132 Put differently, a court
prohibiting or permitting a mass surveillance program, with an attendant
mass collection of what has been traditionally considered private
information, will on some level want to know whether the program is
efficacious or scientifically sound.

D . Daubert, the Fourth Amendment, and Post-Snowden Litigation on Bulk
Telephony Metadata Collection
Whether a Daubert-type inquiry can be integrated into the Fourth
Amendment analytical framework and, if so, exactly how it could be
integrated, are questions that exceed the scope of this Article. As I have
stated above, I reserve these questions for future scholarship. However, the
129. See e.g., Shayana Kadidal, NSA Surveillance: Issues of Security, Privacy, and Civil Liberty,
10 J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO . Soc'y 433, 469-70 (2014) (recognizing the role of
effectiveness/ineffectiveness in the arguments of the government regarding what extent Fourth
Amendment/Fourth Amendment-like analysis should be considered in surveillance).
130. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 8.
131. Speculative aspects of this research remain unavoidable due to the covert nature of the
surveillance methods and because of the highly technical aspect of these programs themselves.
132. See, e.g ., infra Part 11.D (discussing Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp . 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013)
and ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D .N.Y 2013)).
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discussion below attempts to establish a foundation for why an integration of
a Daubert-type analysis is useful in evaluating the legality and
constitutionality of big data cybersurveillance programs generally, and the
programs of the Snowden disclosures, in particular.
To help more clearly illustrate how big data cybersurveillance and mass
dataveillance appears to be forcing an evolution of the Fourth Amendment
doctrine in light of efficacy concerns, it is useful to turn to the litigation that
immediately followed the Snowden disclosures. The most mature litigation
challenging the legality of what was revealed by the Snowden disclosures
thus far is represented by two cases concerning bulk telephony metadata
collection. Both of these cases challenged the Section 215 USA PATRIOT
Act bulk metadata program in federal court days after the Snowden
disclosures first came to light on June 5-6, 2013. 133 In perhaps the most
poignant example on the relevancy of a Daubert-type analysis, the U .S.
District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, William H .
Pauley III, in ACLU v . Clapper, and U.S. District Court Judge for the
District of Columbia, Richard Leon, in Klayman v. Obama, considered the
same program-bulk telephony metadata collection-and reached entirely
different interpretations of the efficacy of the program. 134
In both ACLU v. Clapper and Klayman v. Obama, asserting a
combination of statutory and constitutional claims, the plaintiffs challenged
the bulk telephony metadata program that pertained to a May 24, 2006,
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order requiring Verizon to
turn over all telephony metadata to the NSA pursuant to Section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act. 135 It is important to note, however, that plaintiffs
133. For a detailed history of the Snowden disclosures, see generally GREENWALD, supra note I .
134. See, e.g ., Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 40-42; Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 729-30.
135. See Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection, supra note I , at 759 n.l (discussing In re
Application of the Fed . Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct.
May 24, 2006), available at https://www .eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_ldec20l_r
edacted .ex_-_ocr_0 .pdf (released by court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation' s
Freedom of Information Act (FOlA) litigation)); see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN ., NAT' L
SEC . AGENCY, ST-06-0018, ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS, available
at http://www .dni .gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum %20of%
20US .pdf (see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production). For purposes of a more precise citation, I
draw from both sources . See also Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 1, at 1757 ("The
FISC has agreed, authorizing such bulk metadata collection for the first time in May 2006, and
reauthorizing this collection (from, at a minimum, the three largest service providers) every ninety
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litigating government mass surveillance programs in recent years have faced
several jurisdictional and doctrinal hurdles. These hurdles have included,
for example, overcoming the government's standing challenges 136 and the
government's challenges under the State's Secrets Doctrine. 137 In addition,
for those challenging mass surveillance and mass dataveillance under the
Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures, overcoming the "third-party doctrine" or "third-party records
doctrine" of the Fourth Amendment has posed a particularly difficult hurdle.
The third-party doctrine is enshrined within the current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence through Smith v. Maryland. 138 In Smith, the
Court held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone
numbers that individuals dial on the reasoning that the customer knowingly
shares information and records with the telephone provider. Because a
telecommunications customer knowingly shares data with a third-party
provider, the Court determined in Smith that there was neither an actual nor
subjective expectation of privacy. Justice Harry A. Blackmun explained that
Smith voluntarily waived his privacy right because he "conveyed numerical
information to the phone company [third party] and ... assumed the risk that
the company would reveal the information to the police." 139
Thus, in extending the logic of the third-party doctrine to the present day
and in the case of the Snowden disclosures, it could be argued that when
data is shared with a third party (e.g., Verizon, Google, Apple, etc.) the
Court's Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy test
established in Katz v. United States 140 does not hold. Under Katz, the twoprong "reasonable expectation of privacy" test requires "first that a person
days since then, including in the wake of the Snowden affair.").
136. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs
lacked standing because of a lack of certainty and traceability of the purported future injury); Jewel
v. National Sec . Agency, 673 F3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that residential telephone customers
had standing to challenge warrantless eavesdropping). The litigation in Jewel is ongoing under Case
4:08-cv-04373-JSW, available at Order on Motions for Summary Judgment, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://www .eff.org/document/order-motions-summary-judgment-1 (last visited May
11, 2015).
137. See, e.g., U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (holding that the government has a evidentiary
privilege preventing a court ordered disclosure of intelligence or military secrets). But see In re
National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (holding that FISA preempted the state secrets privilege) .
138. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
139. Id. at 744.
140. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) .
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have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy ." 141 And, as a
follow-on inquiry, the test requires an objective expectation of privacy as
well: "second, that the expectation [of privacy] be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."' 142
Citing to Smith and in relying upon the third-party doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment, Judge Pauley in ACLU v. Clapper concluded that the Fourth
Amendment was not violated because the bulk telephony metadata was
shared by the telecommunications consumer (plaintiff ACLU) with a third
party (Verizon). 143 Therefore, no reasonable expectation of privacy under
Katz could be established. 144
In contrast, in the case of Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon determined
that the third-party doctrine could not be extended to the facts at hand for the
following reason: the NSA's mass collection of U.S. telephone data is
"almost Orwellian," and a likely violation of the U.S . Constitution.145 Judge
Leon explained, "I cannot imagine a more 'indiscriminate' and 'abitrary
invasion' than this systematic and high-tech collection and retention of
personal data on virtually every single citizen for purposes of querying and
analyzing it without prior judicial approval." 146
In both cases, however, the judges appeared to first reach for a way to
determine the reasonableness of bulk telephony metadata collection to test
the Fourth Amendment's outer boundary of what is an "unreasonable"
search or seizure. In ACLU v. Clapper, Judge Pauley in the Southern
District of New York dismissed the ACLU's constitutional claim against the
program, stating that, "[t]he effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata
collection cannot seriously be disputed," 147 quickly listing several examples
offered by the government itself to support this claim. 148 By contrast, in
Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon in the District of D.C., following his
agreement with the potential constitutional claim of the petitioner Klayman
141. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
142. Id.
143. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 749-52.
144. Id. at 752 ("Because Smith controls, the NSA's bulk telephony metadata collection program
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.") .
145. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 33-37.
146. Id. at 42.
147. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 755.
148. Id. Judge Pauley here notes that the examples that he presents in his opinion are "several
successes" elucidated from "Congressional testimony and in declarations that are part of the record
in this case." Id.
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against the same program, states that, "the Government does not cite a single
instance in which analysis of the NSA's bulk metadata collection actually
stopped an imminent attack," while dismissing the examples offered by the
government as no better than what traditional methods would have
illuminated.149
Much like Daubert in the evidentiary context, the federal judges in
Klayman v. Obama and in ACLU v. Clapper demanded some level of
validity from the bulk telephony metadata program before deciding whether
a legal consequence is warranted. While it is impossible to know to what
extent these efficacy concerns subtly influenced the legal analyses of Judge
Pauley and Judge Leon, or whether either judge would find it to be relevant
to constitutionality determinations, the role of efficacy and assurance of
some level of scientific validity seemed to inform their legal analysis. The
subtle call for a scrutiny of the program's effectiveness found in both
opinions perhaps should have a place in a new Fourth Amendment analysis
that has been called for elsewhere, where modern technology and dated
precedent collide .150
Analogous to the criminal context, government electronic surveillance
potentially implicates important rights of the individuals to whom the
surveillance is applied without the benefits of many of the procedural
safeguards in place for, by way of example, ordinary criminal defendants. 151
In a small data world, the rights implicated by, for instance, an illegal search
of physical property, at least do not go unnoticed, and have the opportunity
through specific procedures to be vindicated. 152 However, now "[w]ith the
rise of electronic surveillance conducted remotely and surreptitiously ... the
government has achieved an unprecedented amount of control" 153 without
the traditional protections of a small data world. Indeed, as is the case with

149. Klayman, 957 F . Supp . 2d at 40 .
150. See, e.g., United States v . Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(questioning the applicability of the third party doctrine to modern technology and Fourth
Amendment analysis); see also Kevin Miller, Total Surveillance, Big Data, and Predictive Crime
Technology: Privacy's Perfect Storm, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 105, 110 (2014).
151. See, e.g., Patrick Toomey & Brett Max Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance,
Criminal Defendants, & The Right to Notice, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV . 843, 847-48 (2014) (noting
Fourth Amendment implications and potentially others to individuals subject to electronic
surveillance) .
152. Id.
153. Id. at 847 (specifically referring to the government's control over notice - or the decision not
to notify - the person victimized by government electronic surveillance).
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big data, which this Article and others following will endeavor to articulate,
the government's "collect-it-all" approach is unprecedented, and carries with
it the potential for ubiquitous and pervasive surveillance. 154 While the
intelligence community admits to this "collect-it-all" approach to digital
information collection, 155 all of the legal and constitutional consequences to
this collection for individuals are still undetermined. 156 There is little doubt,
however, that many of these programs can have consequences for some
individuals. 157
A Daubert-type interrogation focusing on scientific validity and
reliability prior to legal consequences could, perhaps, illuminate a new
understanding of the reasonableness of Fourth Amendment intrusions, 158
provide a legal defense to criminal defendants who are subjected to
unwarranted surveillance, 159 or spark a legislative restructuring of the
surveillance architecture in existence to better assure scientific reliability
prior to the initiation of surveillance programs . This, in essence, is the
154. See, e.g., Nakashima & Gellman, supra note 7 (discussing collect it all approach and the
unprecedented nature of the NSA to do so with the use of some programs) .
155. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 150, at 110 (discussing a profile of NSA Director General Keith
Alexander, which stated that he "wants as much data as he can get . . . [a]nd he wants to hang on to it
for as long as he can").
156. While the author recognizes a substantial need for a thorough review of the Fourth
Amendment implications of wide scale, electronic surveillance, this is beyond the scope of this
Article's particular purpose.
157. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year Audit
Finds, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsabroke-pri vacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/ 15/331 0e554-05ca- l le3-a07f49ddc74 l 7 l 25_story .html (reporting that the NSA "counted 2,776 incidents in the preceding 12
months of unauthorized collection, storage, access to or distribution of legally protected
communications. Most were unintended . Many involved failures of due diligence or violations of
standard operating procedure . The most serious incidents included a violation of a court order and
unauthorized use of data about more than 3,000 Americans and green-card holders ."); see also
Memorandum from Chief of Signals Intelligence Division (SID) to SIGINT (May 3, 2012),
available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-thefirst-quarter-of-2012/395 .
158. "Reasonableness" here is intended to mean within the context of seminal Fourth Amendment
case Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and those cases interpreting it thereafter.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Dreyer, 767 F3d 826, 828 n.l (9th Cir. 2014) (challenging the
introduction of evidence derived from a Naval secret agency program based on Daubert, while the
court did not rule on the merits of this argument, the notion of a Daubert challenge to covert
surveillance program is notable); see also United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 277 (1st Cir.
2012) (noting that the "defendant argue[d] that he has a right to the source code in order to determine
whether he could credibly challenge the reliability of the technology, and thus, block the expert
testimony proffered by the government on the E2P2 program and how it implicated the defendant").
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underlying argument put forth in this Article . While an exact articulation of
how Daubert could or should apply to electronic government surveillance,
big data programs, and the Fourth Amendment is beyond the scope of this
Article, Daubert's close scrutiny of scientific evidence is instructive as to
why the technical aspects of this Article are not only legally relevant, but
critical to understand . A closer understanding of the technical or scientific
aspects of big data cybersurveillance methods can illuminate not only
potential program flaws or avenues for legal claims, but can also lead to a
better understanding of routinely debated particulars, such as whether or not
mass collection is itself a "search" or a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment
purposes. 160 Ultimately, discerning between small data and big data, and
grasping both the capabilities and flaws of big data, mass collection, and
predictive analytics is the foundation for competent legal scrutiny of such
programs, and, hopefully, the effectuation of the constitutional rights of
individuals subject to mass surveillance and bulk data collection.
In summary, as of yet, the Supreme Court has not determined whether
bulk telephony metadata collection is statutorily or constitutionally
permitted. In Klayman v. Obama, Judge Leon granted a preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the
merits of their Fourth Amendment claim against the NSA for the telephony
metadata collection program. 161 As of the date of this publication, no federal
court, in fact, has reached a binding determination on the constitutionality of
the bulk telephony metatdata program on the merits. Judge Leon's
determination of the likely merits of the plaintiff's constitutional claim in
Klayman v. Obama in the District of D.C . was made pursuant to a
preliminary injunction order and, thus, was not a final determination on the
merits. Further, Judge Leon stayed his order of preliminary injunction
pending an appeal, warning that the government should "take whatever steps
necessary to prepare itself to comply with this order when, and if, it is
upheld. Suffice it to say, requesting further time to comply with this order
months from now will not be well received and could result in collateral

160. Members of the government, on several occasions, have claimed that mass collection in and
of itself is not surveillance, especially where big data programs gather metadata. See, e.g., Dianne
Feinstein, Sen . Dianne Feinstein: Continue NSA Call-Records Program, USA TODAY , Oct. 20,
2013 , http://www.usatoday .com/story/opinion/2013/10/20/nsa-call-records-program-sen-dianne-fein
stein-editorials-debates/3112715/ ("The call records program is not surveillance .") .
161. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2013) .
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sanctions ." 162
Although Judge Pauley of the Southern District of New York found the
program constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, and further concluded
that §215 of the USA PATRIOT Act impliedly precludes judicial review,
and that plaintiffs' claim regarding the scope of §215 would fail on the
merits-his decision in ACLU v. Clapper was vacated and remanded on
May 7, 2015. 163 In the latter opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit did not reach the issue of constitutionality, reversing based
on its finding that §215 does not preclude judicial review and that the bulk
telephony metadata collection program exceeds the scope of authorization
under §215. 164
Nevertheless, and interestingly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit opinion concludes with a discussion of the constitutional
issues raised by the bulk telephony metadata program, noting that, on this
issue, the Supreme Court's "jurisprudence is in some turmoil." 165 Instead of
trying to resolve that turmoil, the court called on the legislative branch to
"pass judgment on the value of the telephone metadata program as a
counterterrorism tool" as a way to help courts assess the reasonableness of
the program in the face of constitutional challenges. 166 In other words, the
U .S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has advised that it desires
information on the validity and efficacy of the surveillance program in
question in order to assist the court in deciding its constitutional propriety.
In summary, from the post-Snowden litigation, it appears that whether
or not big data cybersurveillance programs or mass dataveillance systems,
such as the bulk telephony metadata collection program, meet a test of
efficacy or scientific validity is an important inquiry in order to preserve the
integrity of the judicial function, and to preserve the Fourth Amendment's
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. The gatekeeping
function of the judiciary is negated in the Fourth Amendment analysiswhere mass surveillance and big data cybersurveillance tools may be driven
by efficacy presumptions and a scientific justification-if there is no
162.
163.
164.
165.
States
30).
166.

Id. at 44.
ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42-cv, 2015 WL 2097814 (2d Cir. May 7, 2015).
Id.
Id. at *29 (referring to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence leading up to, and including, United
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 565 U.S._ (2012), in the opinion' s subsequent discussion at *29Id. at *31.
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meaningful way to interrogate the reliability of scientific evidence prior to
the implementation of the bulk metadata collection.
III. BACKGROUND ON DATAFICATION AND DATA FuSION: WHY
UNDERSTANDING BIOMETRIC AND BIOGRAPHIC DATAFICATION AND
COLLECTION MATTERS
Also critical to a scientific inquiry, for any purpose, is an understanding
of not only the tools of the science of big data, but also the underlying logic,
scientific reasoning, policy rationales, processes of testing, evaluation of the
vehicles of promulgation, etc. Datafication, thus, is important in that it can
help illuminate the logic, rationales, and the processes of big data tools .
"Datafication" means "transforming [all information] into a data format to
make it quantified." 167 Mass datafication, as will be examined in Part III
below, is one process by which information is translated into data for
interpretation by algorithmic-driven programs. The following description
and discussion of datafication is in service to this Article's larger goal:
calling for the increased scientific inquiry into data-driven programs, big
data tools, and the surveillance architecture that relies on these programs.
Because of the highly technical nature of datafication, it may not be readily
obvious why a call for increased scientific validity is crucial.
Datafication can be understood as the process by which all human
generated activity and knowledge is converted into datafied information, and
then is quantified or assigned status or new meaning. Mass datafication
illuminates not only the process by which large amounts of information
undergo this transformation, but also, as this Article argues, the rationale
behind many preexisting policies that call for the mass collection of datafied
information. In addition, datafication, as a process that facilitates new
knowledge discovery and production, is a relatively new concept from which
statistically-driven assessments and algorithmic-derived inferences can be
enabled. As explained below, these assessments and inferences can appear
to be statistically significant. Consequently, because datafication and big
data tools can form the basis of data-driven suspicion or data-driven guilt
that may lead to legal consequences, a Daubert-type inquiry should be
initiated into this type of process.
To roughly analogize, datafication is to data science as the collection

167. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER,
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and storage of millions of DNA samples 168 are to forensic science. 169 The
mass datafication of DNA has allowed for the rapid growth of DNA
databases. With the growth and prevalence of forensic DNA evidence,
evolving standards for scientific reliability have involved the Daubert
inquiry. 170 The proliferation of DNA databases is, in fact, a form of
datafication. Thus, just as the growth of forensic DNA evidence and DNA
databases has forced evolving standards for assessing the scientific
reliability of this new technological development, the growth of datafication
and the prevalence of data science should now be subjected to similar
scientific reliability assessments. A Daubert-type inquiry into big data
cybersurveillance methods that may be dependent upon datafication and data
science is, therefore, appropriate.
Because datafication is enabled by the proliferation of big data, big data
and datafication go hand-in-hand . Datafication can also be understood as
the underlying drive to force the issue and reinforce the underlying values of
big data: a policy impetus currently underway that mandates or delegates,
often under law or administrative regulation, the collection or sharing of
more and more data to feed the preexisting databases and database-driven
policy protocols .171
Datafication mandates the acquisition and collection of more and more

168. For example, the FBI currently stores the DNA of over 11.6 million offender profiles and
over 612,477 forensic profiles. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www .fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited May 11, 2015) .
According to the FBI, this information is current as of February 2015. Id. "Offender" profiles
include those of convicted offenders, detainees, and arrestees. Id.; see also infra Table 2 (labeled
"Examples of Biometric Datafication").
169. Important research has been conducted by scholars in recent years investigating the
implications of the mass datafication of forensic evidence through, for example, biometric databases,
such as DNA databases . See, e.g., David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA
and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095 (2013); Erin Murphy, License,
Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2013); Erin
Murphy, Databases, Doctrine and Constitutional Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 803 (2010);
Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers: Deciding When DNA Alone is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y .U. L.
REV . 101 (2010) ; Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67
BROOK.L.REV. 13 (2001).
170. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721 (2007) (discussing the efficacy of
the Daubert inquiry in relation to the history of forensic DNA evidence: "[E]ven the short history of
DNA evidence is specked with examples of both questionable methodological assertions and
erroneous applications of techniques.").
171. See id.
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digital data to feed the preex1stmg cybersurveillance structures or the
construction of new structures, and empower government actions that are
determined by digital data collection and processing protocols, and mass
data analyses. 172 Datafication can also be characterized as the government's
policy interest in actively developing new forms of stored data and
transforming analog data 173 (e.g., paper-based files) into digital data (e.g .,
centralized databases that are digitally stored and indexed, and electronically
searchable).
A. Surveillance of the Body: Geolocational Data and Biometric Data

In order to encourage a Daubert-type scientific inquiry into big data
cybersurveillance tools and newly emerging surveillance methods, it is
important to understand precisely and technically how 24/7 tracking of the
body is accomplished. This datafication of the body is conducted both
through geolocational and biometric data collection, tracking aggregation,
storage, and analysis. As will be explained further below, the surveillance of
the body can be fused with the surveillance of the biography through big
data tools. This is a transformative technology previously unavailable to the
intelligence community, and it appears that this new surveillance method has
not yet been subjected to scientific interrogation. Further, scholars such as
Laura Donohue have concluded that neither preexisting statutory
frameworks (e .g., surveillance and privacy statutes) nor constitutional
frameworks (e.g., current Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence), are
likely to operate to protect against the new types of surveillance harms
implicated by emerging biometric data tracking technologies. 174
To provide an overview of the breadth and depth of the surveillance of
the body enabled by big data and datafication, the Tables below provide
examples of both geolocational datafication and biometric datafication.
Geolocational datafication is the process by which the movements of people
are tracked and recorded as data. 175 Devices like cellphones and EZ Passes,

172. See id.
173. PCAST REPORT, supra note 20, at 22 (explaining information that is "born analog" as
coming "[f]rom the characteristics of the physical world) .
174. See, e.g ., Donohue, Technological Leap, supra note 18.
175. See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, EUR. COMM'N, OPINION 13/2011 ON
GEOLOCATION SERVICES ON SMART MOBILE DEVICES 1, 3 (2011), available at http://ec .europa.eu/ju
stice/policies/pri v acy /docs/wpdocs/2011/wp 185_en.pdf.
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which facilitate electronic payment of highway tolls, produce data relating to
the locations and movements of people.176 Table 1 provides examples of
geolocational datafication .
Biometric datafication is the process of
transforming individually distinguishing bodily and
behavioral
characteristics into data-a means of datafying the biological body .177
Table 2 provides examples of biometric datafication.
Table 1. Examples of Geolocational Datafication
Program
Demand for
Subscriber
Information from
Cellphone
Carriers

Agency
Law enforcement
agencies

Volume
1.3 million requests in
2011; AT&T, by itself,
received over 700
requests per day in
2011. 178 Approximately 1
million requests in
2012; 179 AT&T received
over 815 requests per day
in 2012 .180

176. Id.
177. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 11.
178. Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N .Y . TIMES, July 9, 2012, at
A 1, available at http://www .nytimes .com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aidsurveillance .html.
179. This calculation is based upon responses of telecommunications companies to an inquiry by
Senator Edward J. Markey . The number does not include data from Sprint Nextel because this
company did not provide exact numbers in response to the Senator's inquiry, but instead offered to
meet with the Senator to discuss in detail the number of varying types of requests they have received
from law enforcement. See For Second Year in a Row, Market Investigation Reveals More Than
One Million Requests by Law Enforcement for Americans Mobile Phone Data, U.S. SENATOR ED
MARKEY MASS. (2013), http://www .markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/for-second-year-in-arow-markey-investigation-reveals-more-than-one-million-requests-by-law-enforcement-for-america
ns-mobile-phone-data.
180. Letter from Timothy P. McKone, Executive Vice President, AT&T, to Edward J. Markey,
U.S . Senator, at Attachment A (Oct. 3, 2013), available athttp://www .markey.senate .gov/document
s/2013-10-03 _ATT _re_Carrier.pdf.
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Automated
License Plate
Readers

U.S . Department of
Homeland Security
(DHS), U.S.
Department of Justice
(DOJ), and other law
enforcement agencies
nationwide

Automated
License Plate
Readers

Private companies such
as MVTrac, which
compiles databases for
repossession agents 183

SunPass RFID
Card for
Tollbooths
E-ZPass RFID
card for
Tollbooths
Smartphones

Florida Department of
Transportation
E-ZPass Group

Various companies
including Android and
Apple

"[H]undreds of millions
of data points reveal[] the
travel histories of
millions of motorists." 181
The state of Maryland
collected more than 85
million license plate
records in 2012. 182
One company, the Digital
Recognition Network
(DRN), has a database
with "over 700 million
data points on where
American drivers have
been." 184
More than 8 million
transponders sold total as
of August 2013. 185
As of 2012, there are
more than 24.3 million EZPass tags. 186
As of January 2014, 58%
of American adults own a
smartphone .187

181. ACLU, You ARE BEING TRACKED: How LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO
RECORD AMERICANS' MOVEMENTS 7 (2013), available at https://www .aclu.org/files/assets/071613aclu-alprreport-opt-v05 .pdf.
182. Id. at 13 .
183. Id. at 28.
184. Id.
185. Michael Turnbell, SunPass to Replace Oldest Transponders, SUN SENTINEL (Aug. 1, 2013),
available at http:!/articles .sun-sentinel .com/2013-08-0l/news/fl-sunpass-glitches-2013073 l_l_trans
ponders-toll-roads-turnpike-enterprise .
186. See About Us, E-ZPASS GROUP, http://www.e-zpassiag.com/about-us (last visited May 11,
2015).
187. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet (last visited May 11, 2015).
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Table 2. Examples of Biometric Datafication
Program
US-VISIT (United
States Visitor and
Immigration Status
Indicator
Technology)
IAFIS (Integrated
Automated
Fingerprint
Identification
System) Biometric
Database
IDENT (Automated
Biometric
Identification
System)

National DNA
Index (NDIS)

Entity

DHS

Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)

DHS

FBI

Volume
Approximately 300,000
fingerprint data
collected per day from
non-citizens crossing
U.S. borders .188
Over 75.9 million
fingerprints in the
criminal master file and
over 39.6 million civil
fingerprints .189

Processes over 200,000
transactions daily and
has over 146 million
individual fingerprint
records on file. "The
monthly growth rate of
[approximate! y] 1
million fingerprint
records is expected to
continue ....,,190
Over 11.6 million
offender profiles and
over 612,477 forensic
profiles .191

188. JENNIFER LYNCH, IMMIGR. POL'Y CTR., FROM FINGER PRINTS TO DNA 4 (2012), available
at http://mygreencard.com/downloads/FingerprintsDNA_May20l2 .pdf.
189. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Fact Sheet, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafi
s_facts .
190. CBP-US-VISIT-Automated Biometric Identification System (/DENT) , IT DASHBOARD
(Aug. 30, 2013), https://myit-2014.itdashboard.gov/.
191. CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi .gov/about-us/lab/
biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited May 11, 2015) . According to the FBI, this
information is current as of February 2015 . Id. "Offender" profiles include those of convicted
offenders, detainees, and arrestees. Id.
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FBI Facial
Recognition Project

FBI

Consular
Consolidated
Database (CCD)

U.S . Department of
State (DoS)

DoD's Next
Generation ABIS

U.S . Departemnt of
Defense (DoD)

Biometric Records
Collected in
Afghanistan

DoD

FBI project to add facial
recognition-ready
photographs of suspects
by 2014. 192 The FBI
expects its facial
recognition repository to
be approximately 70
million photos .193
Over 100 million visa
cases, 90 million
photographs .194
Currently grows at a rate
of 35,000 visa cases
every day .195
Over 6 million total
records, including 1.6
million submissions for
fiscal year 2011. 196
The U.S. military and
Afghan government
have collected more than
2.5 million biometric
records of fingerprints
and iris scans. 197

192. LYNCH, supra note 188, at 3; Aliya Stemstein, FBI to Launch Nationwide Facial
Recognition Service, NEXTGOV (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www .nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111007_6
100.php.
193 . Stemstein, supra note 192 ("The bureau expects its collection of shots to rival its repository
of 70 million fingerprints once more officers are aware of the facial search's capabilities.") .
194. NAT' L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON BIOMEfRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., THE
NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE 6 (2011), available at http://www .biometrics .gov/Documents/
BiometricsChallenge201 l_protected .pdf.
195. U .S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD) PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT (PIA) 1 (2010), available at http://foia.state .gov/_docs/PWConsularConsolidatedData
base_CCD.pdf.
196. BIOMEfRICSIDENTITY MGMT . AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT FYll, at 9 (2012).
197. Biometrics in Afghanistan: The Eyes Have It, ECONOMIST (July 5, 2012, 3:28 PM),
http://www .economist.com/node/21558263 ("Yet America's army and the Afghan government have
collected digital records of more than 2.5m of [Afghans].") .
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B. Surveillance of the Biography: Personally Identifiable Data, Behavioral
Data, and Other Biographical Data
Our daily habits and behaviors leave data traces that help profile and
make comprehensible to third parties our consuming habits, interests, and
social involvements. 198 The public and private sectors increasingly collect,
store, and analyze biographical and behavioral data in whatever form it is
datafied. 199 According to Balkin, more than the war on terror, it is the
development of a technologically-driven and Internet-supported Information
Society that has led to the National Surveillance State. "The war on terror
may be the most familiar justification for the rise of the National
Surveillance State, but it is hardly the sole or even the most important
cause." 200 As Balkin further explains, "Government's increasing use of
surveillance and data mining is a predictable result of accelerating
developments in information technology. As technologies that let us
discover and analyze what is happening in the world become ever more
powerful, both governments and private parties will seek to use them." 201
Table 3 provides examples of the kinds of data traces that we leave that
enables the construction of behavioral profiles. So far, as discussed above,
courts are unresolved on the constitutionality of the NSA's bulk metadata
collection program and the legal processes that justify queries of that data, 202
but have not addressed the scientific validity of the queries themselves.203

198. Balkin, National Surveillance State, supra note 14, at 12.
199. Id. at 14.
200. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted) (citing Andrew Cohen, The Legal War on Terror: White House
Describing
Surveillance
in
Military
Terms,
CBS
NEWS
(Jan.
22,
2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-legal-war-on-terror-22-01-2006/).
201. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and
National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1464---69 (2004); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GA0-04-548, DATA MINING: FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES (2004), available
athttp://www.gao.gov/new .items/d04548.pdf).
202. See supra Part 11.D.
203 . See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F . Supp. 2d 724, 755 (S.D .N.Y . 2013) (stating that "[t]he
effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata collection cannot be seriously disputed . . .. [T]he
Government has acknowledged several successes . . . . [T]hey offer ample justification" and then
providing three instances of the NSA's metadata collection program's successes). Yet, the court
relied on the government's unofficial testimony of success rather than expert testimony regarding the
efficacy of the scientific inquiries used. Id.
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Table 3. Examples of Behavioral Datafication
Entity
Google

Type of Data
Web Browsing

Facebook

Uploading
Photos; "Like"
Clicks; and
Comments

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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Volume of Data
Google is more than 100 petabytes in
size.204 Google has more than one
trillion indexed URLs and more than
3 million servers.205 Google
experiences more than 7 .2 billion
page views per day .206 "Google
processes more than 24 petabytes of
data per day, a volume that is
thousands of times the quantity of all
printed material in the U.S. Library of
Congress ."207
Facebook is more than 300 petabytes
in size.208 Facebook has more than 1
billion users as of August 2012. 209 An
estimated 35% of all of the world's
digital photos are currently stored on
Facebook.210 "[M]ore than 10 million
new photos [are] uploaded [on
Facebook] every hour." 211 "Facebook
members click a 'like' button or leave
a comment nearly three billion times
per day, creating a digital trail that the
company can mine to learn about
users' preferences ."212

See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 .
Id.
Id.
MA YER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 8.
Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72.
Id.
Id.
MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 8.
Id.
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YouTube 213

Uploading
Videos

Twitter

Tweets

Global
Texting

Text Messages

Cell Phone
and
Smartphone

Mobile Calls

Y ouTube is more than 1,000
petabytes in size.214 Over 72 hours of
video is uploaded on Y ouTube per
minute .215 YouTube has more than 4
billion views per day .216 "800 million
monthly users of Google's YouTube
service upload over an hour of video
every second."217
Twitter generates more than 124
billion tweets per year .218 "The
number of messages on Twitter grows
at around 200 percent a year and by
2012 had exceeded 400 million
tweets a day ." 219 It is estimated that
there are more than 4,500 tweets per
second.220
There are more than 6.1 trillion texts
per year, and there are more than
193,000 texts per second.221
There are more than 2.2 trillion cell
phone calls per year; roughly more
than 19 minutes of cell phone usage
per person per day .222

213. Y ouTube was acquired by Google in 2006. Paul R . La Monica, Google to Buy YouTube for
$1 .65 Billion, CNNMONEY (Oct. 9, 2006, 5:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/
googleyoutube_deal/.
214. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 .
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. MA YER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 8 .
218. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 .
219. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 8.
220. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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C. Fusion of 2417 Surveillance of the Body and 360° Surveillance of the
Biography
The various kinds of datafication and new surveillance methods appear
to enable the government to engage in a fusion of locational-body
surveillance and biographical-behavioral surveillance to infer a suspect
status . The fusion process facilitates the government's protocols for identity
verification and identity management purposes to enable tracking and data
analytics (e .g., identifying a potential suspect or terrorist) . To better
understand the fusion process under big data tools, it is instructive to refer to
the 2014 White House report to the President from the President's Council
of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), titled Big Data and
Privacy: A Technological Perspective. 223 This report described the fusion
process in the private sector consumer context in the following manner224:
Data fusion occurs when data from different sources are brought
into contact and new facts emerge (see Section 3 .2.2) . Individually,
each data source may have a specific, limited purpose . Their
combination, however, may uncover new meanings . In particular,
data fusion can result in the identification of individual people, the
creation of profiles of an individual, and the tracking of an
individual's activities . More broadly, data analytics discovers
patterns and correlations in large corpuses of data, using
increasingly powerful statistical algorithms. If those data include
personal data, the inferences flowing from data analytics may then
be mapped back to inferences, both certain and uncertain, about
individuals .
This 2014 White House PCAST report recognizes that fusion in data
analytics can be used by the government.225 Specifically, the President's
Council Advisors on Science and Technology noted:
After data are collected, data analytics come into play and may
generate an increasing fraction of privacy issues .. . it is the use of
a product of [big data] analysis, whether in commerce, by

223 . PCAST REPORT , supra note 20.
224. Id. at x.
225. Id at xii .
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government, by the press, or by individuals, that can cause adverse
consequences to individuals .226
IV. BACKGROUND ON DIGITAL AVATAR CONSTRUCTION: WHY
INTERROGATING THE VIRTUAL REALITY RISKS OF "COLLECT-IT-ALL"
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND DATA FuSION IN A BIG DATA WORLD
MATTERS

In Parts II and III above, this Article describes how big data
technologies and the phenomenon of datafication facilitate "collect-it-all"
tools that are markedly distinct from the "collect-it-all" tools that were once
available to the intelligence community in a small data surveillance context.
In Part IV below, I discuss how, in a big data world, "collect-it-all"
intelligence gathering can now potentially facilitate the construction of
digital avatars. The digital avatar perhaps can best be understood as a virtual
representation of our digital selves. This construction may be enabled
through processes such as the data fusion of biometric and biographic data,
or the digital data fusion of the 24/7 surveillance of the body and the 360°
surveillance of the biography. Further, data science rationales and big data
tools appear to be driving the expansion of these emerging methods.
Consequently, in Part V, I suggest that an inquiry into the scientific validity
of the data science that informs big data cybersurveillance programs may be
appropriate .

A. Fusion of Biometric and Biographical Data to Construct Digital
Avatars
From the Snowden disclosures, it appears that the legal or other
consequences that may flow from the big data cybersurveillance or mass
dataveillance methods are suffered by the person associated with the
suspicious digital data and, potentially, conflated with the guilty digital
avatar or the digital avatar's technological surrogate (e.g., a smartphone).227
In other words, in a big data world, the intelligence community may view
the digital avatar or technological surrogate as a proxy for the actual person
226. Id.
227. See discussion supra Part I (citing Scahill & Greenwald, supra note 23 ("'We're not going
after people-we're going after their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that
missile is the bad guy."' (quoting drone strike operator))).
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targeted. 228 Consequently, the discussion below sets forth a description of
the data science and technology that I contend facilitates the construction of
the digital avatar-data science and underlying scientific presumptions that I
assert should be tested against a Daubert-type inquiry to check the scientific
validity of the methods .
For at least two decades, since the rise of the Information Society,
experts and scholars have been searching for the proper vocabulary to
describe data surveillance, or "dataveillance,"229 and the new capacities and
consequences of this "'new surveillance."'230 This new form of mass
dataveillance and cybersurveillance is enabled by the advent of technologies
that "datafies"231 all aspects of information (e.g., all aspects of social life,
and human-generated activity and knowledge can be quantified, digitalized,
stored, accessed, and analyzed) .232 The terms "data self'233 and "cyber
self' 234 are used in a variety of contexts to describe self-manipulation of an
online reputation . The concept of "digital personhood," 235 however, is
different. In contrast, it describes how "digital dossiers" 236 can be created by

228. See id. ("According to a former drone operator for the military's Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) who also worked with the NSA, the agency often identifies targets based on
controversial metadata analysis and cell-phone tracking technologies.").
229. Roger Clarke is attributed with first introducing the term "dataveillance" into academic
discourse. See Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM. ACM 498
(1988). Clarke describes dataveillance as the systematic monitoring or investigation of people's
actions, activities, or communications through the application of information technology . Id. ; see
also LYON, supra note 2, at 16 ("Being much cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance
[dataveillance] enables the watching of more people or populations, because economic constraints to
surveillance are reduced . Dataveillance also automates surveillance . Classically, government
bureaucracies have been most interested in gathering such data ...."); MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL
DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS (2007) (examining
constitutional implications of "knowledge discovery in databases" (KDD applications) through
dataveillance).
230. LYON, supra note 2, at 87-88 .
231. MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4 .
232. Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72; see, e.g., DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, PRESENT SHOCK
(2013); JAMESGLEICK, THE INFORMATION: AHISTORY, A THEORY, A FLOOD (2011) .
233. See, e.g., Robert Gordon, The Electronic Personality and Digital Self, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 8
(2001).
234. Chassity N. Whitman & William H. Gottdiener, The Cyber Self: Facebook as a Predictor of
Well-being, INT'L J . APPLIED PSYCHOANALYTIC STUD. (2015) .
235. DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (2004) .
236. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, supra note 107.
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others to construct our "data-double," 237 "data image," 238 "digital persona," 239
"electronic personality and digital self,"240 etc. The common goal of these
multiple terms is an attempt to describe that in an Information Society, "the
interest of surveillance [is] not in complete bodies ... but in fragments of
data[ .]"241 Relatedly, the concept of the "proliferation of networked
identities and selves[,]" 242 concerns the preservation of the autonomous self
within the infrastructure of the Information Society.
For this Article, however, despite other preexisting terminology, there
are many reasons why "digital avatar" is a more appropriate term than
"digital person," "digital self," etc . One reason is that the intelligence
community appears to use similar terminology. Chief Technology Officer of
the CIA, Ira "Gus" Hunt, for example, evokes the image of the transporter243
237. Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. Soc . 605
(2000) .
238. LYON, supra note 2, at 87 (citing David Lyon, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 19 (1994)).
239. Id. at 87-88 (citing Roger Clarke, The Digital Persona and Its Application to Data
Surveillance, 10 THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 2, 77-92 (1994)).
240. Gordon, supra note 233 .
241. LYON, supra note 2, at 88 (citing Haggerty & Ericson, supra note 237, at 612) .
242. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While Preventing
Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1413-14 (2014)
(referring to the work of Professor Tal Z. Zarsky) ; see also JULIE COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012); Tal Z. Zarsky,
Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV . 1375 (2014); Tal Z . Zarsky,
Mining the Networked Self, 6 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 120 (2012), available at
http://jrls .oxfordjournals .org/content/6/ l/ 120 .full .pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=b 1gi 1dlZvf3iBX4.
243. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 ("[Y]ou're already a walking sensor platform .
You guys know this I hope, right? Which is that your mobile device, your smartphone, your iPad,
whatever it's going to be, has got a, just, any number of these things [sensors] . . . . What's
happened is that if you're a Star Trek fan, like I was when I was a kid, what's current now is that this
mobile platform, your smartphones, have turned into your communicator, they're becoming your
tricorder, and actually they're becoming your transporter, right?"). It is instructive to examine the
definitions of both "tricorder" and "transporter," as Hunt uses both terms from Star Trek to more
descriptively convey a perception of the big data potential of cloud-mobile-smart technologies . In
Star Trek, a tricorder is a multifunction hand-held device used for sensor scanning, data analysis, and
recording data. The transporter device converts a person into a pattern of materials that turns a
person into a data signal that can then be transmitted and reconstructed as a person at another
location . The popularized catchphrase, "Beam me up, Scotty," from Star Trek is commonly
associated with the transporter and the imagery of the hologram of the Star Trek character being
transported as data from one location to another. In a big data world, big data cybersurveillance may
be used to facilitate the construction of a multi-dimensional-like virtual representation of our digital
selves, thus resulting in the datafication of the person in a similar way to the transporter. Although
Hunt does not use the term "digital avatar," his references to the smartphone (and Social-Mobile-
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from Star Trek to explain the phenomenon of the digital person.244 Although
Hunt did not use the term "digital avatar," the transporter reference evoked
an image of a multi-dimensional virtual representation of the digital selves
of others. During a talk at Gigaom's Structure Data conference in New
York City on March 20, 2013, titled The CIA's "Grand Challenge" with Big
Data, 245 Hunt appears to describe how the Internet, the Social-Mobile-Cloud
phenomenon, and smart technologies combined, facilitate the replacement of
the self with the "transporter"246 through, for example, the multi-dimensional
virtual representation of our digital selves.
Put another way, the
"transporter" metaphor appears to support how our digital avatars may be
constructed from the comprehensive aggregation and amalgamation of our
digital footprints (e.g., a "full-arsenal approach that digitally exploits the
clues a target leaves behind in their regular activities on the net to compile
biographic and biometric information that can help implement precision
targeting .")247
As a consequence of an unprecedented historical phenomenon of
datafication-the digitalization of all aspects of knowledge and social
activity-the "data-double" is increasingly conflated with the person who
has been datafied. Profound social and legal consequences result when
private and public entities conflate the data-double with the individual. In
the private context, the White House recognizes that "[s]mall bits of data can
be brought together to create a clear picture of a person to predict
preferences or behaviors."248 In other words, consumer data-doubles can
lead corporations to seek what the White House refers to as "perfect
personalization ."249
Cloud technologies) as possessing a similar functionality as a tricorder and transporter appear to
parallel the intelligence community' s data collection ambitions by fusing an individual 's biometric
and biographic data to create a multi-dimensional data likeness of the smartphone user or user of
other social-cloud-mobile-smart technologies .
244. STAR TREK, created by Gene Roddenberry, currently owned by Paramount, is a Registered
Trademark of Paramount Pictures Corporation . See, e.g., JUSTIN EVERETT, THE INRUENCE OF STAR
TREK ON TELEVISION, FILM, AND CULTURE 186 (2008) . Legal scholars have also noted Star Trek's
relevancy to the study of the law . See, e.g., Paul Joseph & Sharon Carton, The Law of the
Federation: Images of Law, Lawyers, and the Legal System in "Star Trek: The Next Generation," 24
U. TOL. L. REV . 43 (1992).
245. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 .
246. Id.
247. Risen & Poitras, supra note 16.
248. PODESTA REPoRT, supra note 61, at 7 .
249. Id.
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Similarly, in the intelligence context and in a big data world, it appears
that the intelligence community also seeks to understand how "[s]mall bits
of data can be brought together to create a clear picture of a person to predict
preferences or behaviors."25° Consequently, the term "digital avatar,"
although currently used in the virtual gaming context, also appears to be
appropriately used in the intelligence gathering context. Just as Hunt's use
of the term "transporter" is not intended to be literal, the term "digital
avatar" is not intended to be literal, either. Rather, this Article's usage of the
term "digital avatar" attempts to identify appropriately descriptive
vocabulary that might more accurately capture the capacities and ambitions
of big data tools now at the intelligence community's disposal.251
In other words, the digital avatar analogy is very apt in the following
ways: it appears to capture the intelligence community's ambition to create
hologram-like representations of the digital selves of others. The analogy is
incomplete in that it does not appear to adequately capture the actual
technological capacities of the intelligence community. More data about
what the intelligence community is doing would be necessary in order to
understand how accurate this analogy is. In the meantime, it provides a
useful frame of reference to conceptualize the importance of Daubert in
assessing the scientific validity of the intelligence community's ambitions
and methods.
The continuing integration of big data tools and datafication into our
Information Society currently underway marks a moment of historical
transformation. As the big data revolution transforms how we capture and
analyze data generally-in other words, as we move from a small data world
to a big data world-the intelligence community will necessarily adapt.
This adaptation means moving from small data intelligence tools to big data
intelligence tools. Small data tools and technology represent a reality as we
once knew it. Big data tools and technologies facilitate a virtually
250. Id.; see also LYON, supra note 2, at 88 ("[T]he data-double emerges consequent on the
interest of surveillance not in complete bodies to be controlled, but in fragments of data emanating
from the body." (citing Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51
BRIT.]. Soc. 605 (2000))).

251. Although some might object to the use of this term in this context because of the emerging
and covert nature of the topic, identifying more consistent and precise vocabulary is challenging . In
other words, because the technologies of big data cybersurviellance are new and secretive, further
dialogue and transparency of the big data science that underscores the rationales behind these new
surveillance methods are needed to develop an agreed-upon terminology for big data
cybersurveillance tools and phenomena.
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understood reality. The potential consequences of this new virtual reality in
the intelligence context-big data cybersurveillance systems built upon
datafication and big data knowledge-necessitate scientific validation before
full, or further, implementation.
To assist in the interrogation of this fusion of biometric and biographic
data, to construct the digital avatar within the surveillance architecture, 252 it
is helpful to anchor this discussion around a single NSA document revealed
through the Snowden disclosures. In a particularly illuminating disclosure,
it was revealed that the intelligence community, such as the NSA, is moving
away from "traditional communications."253 Historically, in a small data
world, intelligence gathering and investigatory methods focused on the
vertical use of data-for example, drilling down on a particular crime or
suspect.254 In an Information Society and big data world, intelligence
gathering and investigatory methods appear to focus now on the horizontal
use of data, which is necessary in a world where digital data is gathered
indiscriminately and stored indefinitely, and no particular crime or suspect
necessarily exists. "Vertical scaling of data" 255 in a strictly technical
capacity sense involves the improvement of computer processing power
within a machine. 256 "Horizontal scaling of data" 257 involves utilizing the

252. This Article's usage of the term "architecture" attempts to follow the vocabulary of the
intelligence community . See, e.g ., Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 . During the 2013
Gigaom's Structure Data presentation, Hunt used the term "architecture" in the following way to
help illuminate the topic of his talk, "The CIA's Grand Challenge with Big Data":
We actually want a push into what we call peta scale memory architectures to do
distributed analytics and things like that. Okay, and this is what's driving all these
technology shifts that you read about all the time . Alright, and what we think is doing is
this is going to drive new competing architectures that will radically shift how things
happen in the world .
Id.
253 . Risen & Poitras, supra note 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) .
254. See MAYER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 4, at 157.
255. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72. Within Hunt' s PowerPoint slides, he includes one
titled, "Tectonic Technology Shifts ." Id. The slide juxtaposes "Traditional Processing" and "Mass
Analytics/Big Data." Under "Traditional Processing," Hunt identifies "Vertical Scaling" of data. Id.
256. See B. Arputhamary & L. Arockiam, Data Integration in Big Data Environment, BONFRING
INT'L J. DATA MINING, Feb. 2015, available athttp://www.academia.edu/10662652/Data_lntegratio
n_in_Big_Data_Environment.
257. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72. Within Hunt's PowerPoint slides, he includes one
titled, ''Tectonic Technology Shifts." Id. The slide juxtaposes "Traditional Processing" and "Mass
Analytics/Big Data." Id. Under "Mass Analytics/Big Data," Hunt identifies "Horizontal Scaling" of
data. Id.; see also Richards & King, Big Data Ethics, supra note 58, at 394 ("Peter Mell, a computer
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maximum amount of processing power possible among multiple
machines. 258 Because of the ever-increasing data flows that society
produces-and the national security infrastructure that has announced its
ambition to "collect it all" -more and more supercomputing technologies
are necessary to process these vast data sets. Thus, the government has
created immense data processing centers such as the NSA's Utah Data
Center259 and data fusion centers in nearly all 50 states.260 In short, due to the
ease of data generation and collection in the digital age-and the shift to
horizontal scaling that allows for near limitless computing power-the
assumption now leads with the proposition that everyone is a potential
suspect.261
The fusion process functions not only to forecast the perceived threat of
individuals-for example, those perceived to be suspected criminals or
terrorists-but increasingly, the fusion process appears to forecast the
perceived threats of social and political movements; the perceived threats of
mass populations, subpopulations, and classifications of individuals; protest
movements; and what the government terms as other "social contagions." 262
Yet, some in the intelligence community may contend that data fusion
and the "collect-it-all" approach is a small data "mosaic theory" approach to
"The 'mosaic theory' describes a basic precept of
surveillance.263

scientist with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, similarly constrains big data to
'[w]here the data volume, acquisition velocity, or data representation limits the ability to perform
effective analysis using traditional relational approaches or requires the use of significant horizontal
scaling for efficient processing."' (internal citation omitted)).
258. Id.
259. James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You
Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/ ("At a
million square feet, this $2 billion digital storage facility outside Salt Lake City will be the
centerpiece of the NSA 's cloud-based data strategy and essential in its plans for decrypting
previously uncrackable documents .").
260. See Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information, U.S. DEPT . OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://www.dhs .gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information (last visited May 11, 2015) .
261. "[A]ccording to [one intelligence] official: 'Everybody's a target; everybody with
communication is a target."' Bamford, supra note 259; see also James Bamford, Big Brother is
Listening, ATLANTIC (Apr. 2006), available at http://www .theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2006/04/big-brother-is-listening/304711/ (providing an early analysis of NSA collection techniques
pre-Snowden disclosures) .
262. See, e.g., Pentagon Spending Millions to Prepare for Mass Civil Unrest, RT (June 13, 2014,
8:22 PM), http://rt.com/usa/165844-pentagon-minerva-research-initiative/.
263. In recent Fourth Amendment cases, the "mosaic theory" has not emerged as a theory of
investigation or surveillance, but rather as a method to preserve a meaningful way to assess
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intelligence gathering: disparate items of information, though individually of
limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when
combined with other items of information." 264
Under big data
cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance tools, however, the "mosaic
theory" has been transformed into a "connect-the-dots" theory where, as one
intelligence official explained, "[e]verybody's a target; everybody with
communication is a target." 265
Rachel Levinson-Waldman explains the "connect-the-dots" theory of
big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance this way: "One chief
argument in favor of retaining all information gathered, regardless of its
apparent law enforcement value, is that seemingly innocuous information
may prove meaningful today or in the future when connected with other
'dots' of information."266 This theory has been used by multiple leaders in
the intelligence community, including Gus Hunt, Chief Technology Officer
of the CIA:
The value of any piece of information is only known when you
can connect it with something else that arrives at a future point in
time .... Since you can't connect dots you don't have, it drives us
into a mode of, we fundamentally try to collect everything and hang
on to it forever. 267
Former NSA Director, General Keith Alexander, similarly used the "connect
the dots" theory to justify NSA cybersurveillance programs after the
reasonable privacy expectations under the Fourth Amendment, as Orin Kerr, Ben Wittes, Danielle
Citron, David Gray and others have noted. See, e.g., David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A

Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381, 390 (2013); Orin S . Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,313 (2012); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United
States v . Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PuB. POL'Y. 1, 3-4 (2012); Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the
Mosaic, GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www .brookings .
edu/research/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes. I reserve for future scholarship a more careful
study of the mosaic theory, the Fourth Amendment, and big data cybersurveillance.
264. David E . Pozen, The Mosaic Theory , National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act,
115 YALE LJ. 628, 630 (2005) .
265. Bamford, supra note 259 .
266. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 45, at 17 (citing Pozen, supra note 264, at 630-31).
267. Matt Sledge, C/A's Gus Hunt on Big Data: We 'Try to Collect Everything and Hang onto It
Forever,' HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2013, 4:52 PM),http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/20/
cia-gus-hunt-big-data_n_2917842 .html.
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Snowden disclosures. 268 The process of combining these dots into a pattern
that suggests terrorist activity is generally called data mining, or 'pattern
prediction': analyzing a store of data to tease out patterns connected to
certain behaviors, and then looking for matching patterns in other datasets in
order to predict other instances in which those behaviors are likely to
occur.269
Superficially, therefore, it appears that the mosaic theory approach to
law enforcement investigations and traditional intelligence gathering in a
small data world (e.g., the collection of disparate pieces of intelligence that
can be pieced together to form a fuller picture of the potential suspect or
crime) parallels the "collect-it-all" approach to data collection or the
"connect-the-dots" theory of mass surveillance policymaking in a big data
world, as explained above. However, the mosaic theory presupposes an ex
post investigation of an offense, generally involving a suspect or group of
suspects . In contrast, in a big data world, the 'investigation' (e.g., mass data
collection policy) takes place ex ante, where no crime has occurred and no
suspect exists. As explained by the representatives of the intelligence
community above, the goal of big data collection, integration, and analytics
is to indiscriminately collect data for two primary purposes: first, to apply
that data to future security needs (e.g., investigation of an unforeseeable
criminal or terrorist investigation that may occur in the future), and, second,
purportedly to predict threats and to preempt future national security risks
(e.g., construct digital avatars and forecast suspects based upon suspicious
digital data from data-mining or database screening, or use pattern-based
analysis or algorithmic intelligence to implement statistically-driven threat
risk assessments).
Consequently, the manner in which the mosaic theory operates in a
small data world context is not easily transferrable to the big data world
context. Further, the underlying scientific method and scientific reasoning
of the "collect-it-all" approach and "connect-the-dots" theory, and the
potential data fusion processes that attach, are not known due to the covert
nature of secret intelligence. Yet, the "collect-it-all" approach and "connectthe-dots" theory, as operative in a big data world, are distinctly

268. Collect It All: America 's Surveillance State, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 7, 2013, 7:15 PM),
http: //www .alj azeera .com/pro grammes/foul tlines/20 13/ 11 / coll ect-i t-all-ameri ca-surveillance-state-20
131158358543439.html.
269. See LEVINSON-WALDMAN, supra note 45, at 17.
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technologically dependent and appear to be data science driven. The
construction of digital avatars and "precision targeting" of digital avatars
(e.g., "full-arsenal approach" that fuses the digital data of "biographic and
biometric information that can help implement precision targeting") 270 and
"precision targeting" of the digital avatar's technological surrogate (e.g., a
smartphone), similarly, appear to be animated with data science reasoning
and big data policymaking. As a result, the data science and underlying
policy rationales deserve close inquiry.

B. Limits of the "Collect-it-All" Approach and Virtual Reality Implications
of Big Data Cybersurveillance
As discussed above, big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance
depend upon a "collect-it-all" approach or a "connect-the-dots" theory of
mass surveillance.271 This new approach to intelligence gathering is highly
controversial.272 Levinson-Waldman has explained that it is a put-the"haystack-before-the-needle approach to information gathering."273 Stephen
Vladeck framed the controversy in this way: there is a presumption that
there is, in fact, a needle in the haystack. 274 Vladeck's point appears to be
that presuming there is a needle in the haystack creates a justification for the
view that all persons are suspects.
Also worthy of caution is the fact that this presumption presents the
potential for multiple challenges, 275 including integrating biases into datadriven systems (e.g., confirmation bias, implicit bias, cognitive bias); path

270. Risen & Poitras, supra note 16.
271. See, e.g ., GREENWALD, supra note 1.
272. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 8.
273. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, supra note I (citing Rachel LevinsonWaldman, The Double Danger of the NSA's "Collect It All" Policy on Surveillance, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 10, 2013, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/10/double-dangernsa-surveillance ).
274. Id. at 334 n.11.
275. Scholars have recently examined the various concerns arising from big data, algorithmicdecisionmaking, and predictive analytics in the private context. See PODESTA REPORT, supra note
61; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 10; Scott R. Peppett, Regulating the Internet of Things : First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014); Ryan
Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Crawford & Schultz, supra
note 10; Pasquale & Citron, supra note 242, at 1413-14 (referring to the work of Professor Tai z.
Zarsky); see also Tai z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, supra note
242.
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dependency (e.g ., building systems to guarantee a correlative "hit" or "miss"
that is intended to indicate data is suspicious; and assuming statistical
certainty that suspicious data proves guilt of terroristic or criminal threat);
overreliance on automation and risk of undertrained analysts; and
exacerbation of perverse incentives (e.g ., metrics of success designed to
track number of suspects identified rather than assess whether intelligence
can independently verify suspect classification). In other words, presuming
that there is a digitally constructed needle (e.g., suspect or terrorist target or
precrime-preterrorist threat that can be digitally identified through big data
tools) in the government's digitally constructed haystack276 (e.g.,
government's attempt to store and analyze all digitally produced data in
order to, purportedly, preempt crime and terrorism) 277 can create incentives
to construct imaginary needles.
Reality as we understand it is changing in light of big data, which
underscores the need for a Daubert-type inquiry to assess the accuracy and
reliability of big data cybersurveillance programs. As boyd and Crawford
have explained, "Big Data reframes key questions about the constitution of
knowledge, the processes of research, how we should engage with
information, and the nature and the categorization of reality ."278 But, what is
the impact of the new "categorization of reality" or new "nature" of reality
in the national security context? For clarification, it is helpful to tum to
Jaron Lanier, referred to as "the father of virtual reality ." 279
Following the Snowden revelations, Lanier asserted that the potential
scientific theory underlying NSA programs should be subjected to greater
scientific scrutiny.
Specifically, he offered his observations on the
cybersurveillance capacities of the NSA, and explained why big data
systems could not capture "the underlying structure of reality ." 280 In an
interview with Scientific American, Lanier explains why big data predictive

276. See Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, supra note 1, at 334 n.11.
277. See Hunt CIA Presentation, supra note 72 .
278. boyd & Crawford, supra note 83 .
279. Janet Maslin, Fighting Words Against Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013 , at Cl , available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/books/who-owns-the-future-by-jaron-lanier .html ?r=O (reviewing Jaron Lanier's book, Who Owns the Future?).
280. Telephone Interview by Seth Fletcher with Jaron Lanier (Oct. 15, 2013) [hereinafter Lanier
Interview], available at http://www .scientificamerican.com/article/lanier-interview-how-to-think-ab
out-privacy/.
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analysis is digitally generated and statistically driven by supercomputing. 281
Yet, these big data methods are not grounded in reality in the scientific
sense. 282
Lanier points to the seductiveness of big data-that it marks a departure
from the frailties of small data, which is clearly tied to the frailties of human
intelligence .283 Lanier points out that big data does have a limited predictive
certainty 284:

If it simply didn't work at all, then that would mean that everyone
who tried to do it would fail, and they would stop trying to do it,
right? However, you know the problem here is that it is a seductive
illusion, and here's how this illusion works: Statistics are correct.
The mathematics behind statistics is valid. So what that means is
that if you are gathering data about the world and you're trying to
predict events that have certain characteristics, which is that they
change gradually and that covers most events in the world, then a
lot of data-a big data approach-statistical projections will, by
definition, work for awhile. You'll be able to project how things
are changing.
The "seductive illusion" of big data's predictions springs from the sense
that the limited and local predictive certainty can be amplified and expanded
into a permanent and overarching predictive mechanism whose accuracy has
comparable certitude.285 But the real world cannot actually be "datafied":
there will always be a gap between the real world and virtual world that
shows the virtual reality to be limited and instrumental within a narrow
context.286 Explains Lanier, "[A] statistical view of the world like that is
very short term .... The world has an underlying structure that statistics can
never address by its nature . . . ." 287 In short, the efficacy of big data is
unquestioned, but only in limited circumstances; its overarching pretensions

281.
282.
283 .
284.
285.
286.
287.
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are simply illusions.288 "And that's why we have scientists and theories ...
to talk about the structure of reality, not just trend lines. So anything relying
on big data and trend lines will hit a wall at some point because [those
statistical] models don't actually fit the structure of reality." 289
288. Id.
289. Id. Lanier's discussion in its entirety:
I think what we can talk about that is concrete is the economic effect [of big data
privacy violations] ... because I think that is really what unifies the issues of the NSA
with the issues of Silicon Valley with the issues of the financial industries. The
fundamental driver for the people who own the biggest computers is confused in my
opinion. And what the driver is the sense that if you can gather the data of a lot of other
people you can use statistics to analyze that data to your own benefit and gain what we
can call an automatic benefit. If you can just analyze everything going on in the world
very carefully to calculate your move in a more informed way than anyone else, you can
create the perfect investment that will always yield a profit, you can create the perfect
business that will always grow and yield a profit, or in the case of the NSA and other
security agencies around the world, you can just press a button and get automatic security
because you have information superiority. And there are a lot of problems with this ...
and one could talk about whether this is fair, one could talk about whether this is
sustainable, but the most important problem with it is that it is self-limiting. And it is
self-limiting in a somewhat tricky way. If it simply didn't work at all, then that would
mean that everyone who tried to do it would fail, and they would stop trying to do it,
right? However, you know the problem here is that it is a seductive illusion, and here's
how this illusion works: statistics are correct. . . . The mathematics behind statistics is
valid. So what that means is that if you are gathering data about the world and you're
trying to predict events that have certain characteristics, which is that they change
gradually and that covers most events in the world, then a lot of data-a big data
approach-statistical projections will, by definition, work for awhile . You'll be able to
project how things are changing. So with enough data you should be able to project the
future of, oh, I don't know, the stock price, or somebody's purchasing behavior, or
somebody's health, or somebody's political leanings, or somebody's likelihood to
participate in a crime, all sorts of things like that. But, the problem is that a statistical
view of the world like that is very short term . .. . The world has an underlying structure
that statistics can never address by its nature, you know . And that's why we have
scientists and theories, you know, to talk about the structure of reality, not just trend
lines. So anything relying on big data and trend lines will hit a wall at some point
because [those statistical] models don't actually reflect the structure of reality. So every
financial scheme that seems to be perfect and an automatic generator of money will at
some point hit the wall of underlying structure and then crash, demanding a giant public
bailout. Exactly the same thing will happen with intelligence agencies that might for a
moment think they have this automatic engine of security but it will hit the underlying
structure of reality and will suddenly fail. Exactly the same thing will happen with
Silicon Valley companies, or so I predict .... So what I think really has to happen for us
to address privacy is first to understand the underlying mistaken understanding of how
statistics can be used to represent reality that's falsely or improperly motivating the
people who run the biggest computers. And as soon as their understanding of the
advantages of big data can be more mature and they can take on a longer-term
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Lanier finally predicts that the big data cybersurveillance methodologies
are likely to collapse due to their failure to reflect an underlying "structure of
reality" 290 He concludes that a rational discussion on the efficacy of big data
cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance methods by the intelligence
community is currently difficult for several reasons, including the
overestimation of the assumed benefits of big data tools and an overreliance
on supercomputing capacities.291
There is, according to Lanier, a
"[m]istaken understanding of advantages of big data. Until the conversation
can be made more mature, people with the biggest computers think that they
have a magic lamp, so it is hard to have a rational conversation."292
According to Lanier, therefore, the conclusions drawn from big data
cybersurveillance are not necessarily drawn from a representation of reality
or fact in the scientific method sense.293 Consequently, it is unclear whether
targets and threats identified by big data cybersurveillance can be reconciled
as real or factually-grounded if analysts abide by definitions of reality or fact
that were forged in a small data world. This is because it is, as yet,
unresolved whether the artificial intelligence tools and statistical-algorithmic
methods of big data cybersurveillance are capable of supporting an
"underlying structure of reality ."294 In other words, big data may discover
"threats" that do not exist in the real world. 295 Lanier's observation on the
immaturity of the discourse surrounding the presumed accuracy and efficacy
of big data cybersurveillance is a function of the fact that we are at the
earliest dawn of generating and deploying these tools. The infancy of the
discussion combined with the illusion of efficacy of big data tools appears to
highlight the need for a Daubert-type inquiry.
perspective, then I think we'll have the basis for talking about privacy that is more
rational. But as long as the people with the biggest computers feel that they have
Aladdin's magic lamp and they can automatically get a benefit from it, it's very hard to
have a rational discussion.

Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.; see also EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM (2013).
293. See, e.g., Kitchin, supra note 26 (suggesting that application of the scientific method differs
when utilized in the data-driven science context) .
294. Lanier Interview, supra note 280.
295. See, e.g., BHAYANI THURAISINGHAM, WEB DATA MINING AND APPLICATIONS IN BUSINESS
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM 203 (2013), available at https://www.utdallas .edu/~jxr06
1100/paper-for-websi te/%5B 18%5DMining-T errorism-NGDM04.pdf.
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V. CONCLUSION
At the earliest dawn of big data, it is difficult to ascertain the accuracy
and efficacy of a big data approach to intelligence gathering and security
decisionmaking. Thus, it is difficult to ascertain whether, and to what
extent, big data tools can be appropriately applied to manage the risks of
perceived security threats. Big data cybersurveillance, unlike small data
surveillance, relies upon data science, datafication and dataveillance,
artificial intelligence, and algorithmic-driven processes. These big data tools
may be used to facilitate the data fusion and construction of our digital
avatars which can potentially, in tum, form the basis for precrime targets and
security threat forecasting . This predictive analysis is digitally generated
and statistically driven by supercomputing; however, it is not grounded in
reality in the scientific sense.
Moving away from a traditional intelligence gathering model that had
previously engaged small data surveillance methods, it appears that, in a big
data world, the intelligence community now employs a "full-arsenal
approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves behind in their
regular activities on the net to compile biographic and biometric information
that can help implement precision targeting." 296 A Daubert-type inquiry can
assist in evaluating whether this "full-arsenal approach" is scientifically
sound, and whether and to what extent rapidly evolving bulk metadata and
mass data surveillance methods increasingly rely upon data science and big
data's algorithmic, analytic, and integrative tools. Further, a Daubert-type
approach to assessing big data cybersurveillance methods initiates an
important conversation: how best to include established scientific validation
questions and testing principles within a framework to evaluate the legality
and constitutionality of these newly emerging methods .
By necessity- given the opacity and complexity of big data
cybersurveillance methods-this Article is highly definitional and
descriptive in its approach. This effort requires the investment of significant
attention to the technologies revealed by the Snowden disclosures and other
recent disclosures on emerging bulk metadata collection, mass data
surveillance efforts, and cybersurveillance policymaking developments. In
this Article, as a topic of academic inquiry, I have argued that a sciencedriven approach to the interrogation of rapidly evolving big data-driven

296. Risen & Poitras, supra note 16.
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mass data surveillance methods deserves to be treated on its own.
Therefore, this Article simply endeavors to explain why Daubert is
relevant to newly emerging big data cybersurveillance and mass
cybersurveillance methods. I conclude that to the extent that covert
intelligence gathering relies upon data science, a Daubert-type inquiry is
helpful in conceptualizing the proper analytical structure necessary for the
assessment and oversight of these emerging big data cybersurveillance
methods. Establishing the underlying "why," as this Article has attempted to
accomplish, now sets the foundation for establishing the underlying "how":
the legal analytical structure for integrating a Daubert-type inquiry into the
Fourth Amendment. In future scholarship, I will address specifically how a
Daubert-type inquiry, or other scientific-driven analyses, could be included
within the Fourth Amendment's analytical framework to evaluate the
reasonableness and efficacy of big data cybersurveillance methods . Thus, I
reserve for future research the question of whether and how the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and other courts could be informed by
Daubert in evaluating the validity of big data cybersurveillance, mass
surveillance, or bulk data collection programs. I also reserve for future
scholarship an analysis of whether the current legal framework suffices to
protect constitutional values in the face of big data cybersurveillance and
mass dataveillance capacities.
In summary, this Article claims that the Supreme Court initiated with
Daubert a tradition of carefully understanding and then interrogating the
scientific reasoning and scientific method that underpins any proposed
evidence that purports to be scientific in nature . Daubert is indicative of a
trend that illustrates the way in which the law attempts to handle science.
Before evidence is deemed worthy of inclusion in trial, when evidence is
scientific-based evidence, the validity of the science that informs the
evidence must meet a minimum evidentiary threshold.
Daubert currently plays no role in the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in evaluating the constitutionality of surveillance tools. Further, it appears
that to the best of public knowledge, the political branches also do not utilize
a Daubert-type inquiry in the oversight of mass surveillance and big data
cybersurveillance methods . As mentioned in the discussion above, however,
a criminal defendant has already attempted to use Daubert as a method to
critique the scientific validity of a mass cybersurveillance system that had
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been deployed to collect evidence against the defendant. 297
Daubert embedded within the judicial oversight function a close
interrogation of the scientific reasoning and scientific method underlying a
proposed piece of evidence as a way to assess whether that evidence should
have a legal consequence against a defendant, civil or criminal. If the
intelligence community is currently presuming the efficacy and the scientific
validity of "collect-it-all" methods, the scientific aspects of intelligence
gathering deserves further examination and greater transparency. Further, if
the intelligence community is currently allowed to implement newly
emerging big data cybersurveillance tools, and if the expansion and
deployment of these tools are driven by data science reasoning without the
benefit of a careful scientific-driven inquiry, then the imposition of a
Daubert-type evidentiary burden is appropriate.
By comparing and
contrasting small data surveillance and big data cybersurveillance methods,
this Article demonstrates why the governing law on surveillance and data
gathering, and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, should now evolve to
assess the efficacy and science of new surveillance methods tested and
deployed in a new big data surveillance world.

297. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Dreyer, 767 F3d 826,
828 n.l (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing the defendant's Daubert challenge of a mass cybersurveillance
program).
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